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[fol. 1] 
IN UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF 
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
F. J. CHRESTENSEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
against 
1 
LEWIS J. VALENTINE, Individually and as Police Commis-
sioner of New York City, Defendant-Appellant 
STATEMENT UNDER RULE XIII 
This action was instituted by the filing of the complaint 
on July 22, 1940 and the issuance of a summons on the same 
day, copies of which were served on the defendant Lewis 
J. Valentine on July 23rd, 1940. Issue was joined by the 
service of the defendant's answer on August 9th, 1940. 
An agreed statement of facts was entered into between the 
parties on November 4th, 1940 and the cause was tried before 
Hon. Murray Hulbert, U. S. District Judge on the same 
day. A decree entered December 13, 1940 declared invalid 
Section 318 of the Sanitary Code of the City of New York 
insofar as .it applied to the distribution by plaintiff or his 
agents of commercial handbills upon the streets, sidewalks 
and public places of New York City and granted the plain-
tiff a permanent injunction for that part of the relief de-
manded in the complaint. 
The Notice of Appeal was filed in the office of the Clerk 
o£ the District Court on March 8th, 1941. 
The plaintiff's attorneys of record are Winthrop, Stim-
son, Putnam & Roberts, Esqs. 
The defendant is represented by William C. Chanler, 
Corporation Counsel of the City of N ew York. 
1 707 
• 
• 
, 
2 
[fo1. 2] IN DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEw YORK 
Civil Action 
File No.9 498 
F. J. OHItESTENSEN, Plaintiff', 
V8. 
LEWIS J. VALENTINE, Individually and as Police Commi8-
sioner of New York City, Defendo/nt 
SUMMONS 
To the above named Defendant: 
You are hereby summoned and required to serve upon 
Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, plaintiff's attorneys, 
whose address 32 Liberty St., N. Y. City, an amrWCl' to the 
complaint which is herewith served upon you, within 20 
days after service of this summons upon you, exclusive of 
the day of service. If you fail to do so, judgment by de-
fault will be taken against you for the relief demanded in 
the complaint. 
Date, July 22, 1940. 
George J. H. Follmer, Clerk of Court. (Seal.) 
[fol.3] IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
COMPLAINT 
To the Honorable, the Judges of the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York: 
The plaintiff, by his attorneys, Winthrop, Stimson, Put-
nam & Roberts, alleges, upon information and belief, as 
follows: 
1. Jurisdiction is founded upon the fact tba t this is it suit 
of a civil nature, in equity, to redress the deprivation, 
under color of state law, ordinance and regulation of rights, 
privileges and immunities, secured by the Constitution of 
the United States and of rights secured by laws of the United 
3 
States providing for equal rights of citizens of the United 
States and of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United 
States. Also, the amount in controversy exceeds Three 
thousand ($3,000) Dollars; there is diversity of citizenship 
and the suit arises under the Constitution and laws of the 
United States. 
2. Plaintiff is a citizen of Florida and of the United 
States, residing at Jacksonville, Florida, and is the owner 
of former United States Navy Submarine S-49. 
3. The defendant, Lewis J. Valentine, is Police Commis-
sioner of New York City, and is a citizen of New York. 
4. For some time past the Police Commissioner of New 
York City, through members of the Police Department, pa1'-
ticularly Captain Edward J. Lennon of the Second Pre-
cinct, has restrained the plaintiff from distributing a ce1'-
tain handbill, a copy of which is attached hereto and marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit A, in the streets and on- the sidewalks 
in New York City, including the streets and sidewalks 
adjoining Battery Park, pursuant to certain ordinances or 
[fol. 4] regulations of New York City set forth in para-
graphs 6 and 7 hereof, and have threatened to arrest any 
employee of plaintiff who distributed said handbill. 
5. For some time past the Police Commissioner of New 
Iy ork City, through members of the Police Department, par-
ticularly Captain Edward J. Lennon of the Second Precinct, 
has restrained plaintiff's employee sandwich men from walk-
ing on the sidewalks and in the streets adjacent to Battery 
Park in New York City pursuant to a regulation Of the 
Department of Parks of New York City, set forth in para-
graph 7 hereof, and have compelled said sandwich men to 
depart from said sidewalks and streets. 
6. Section 318 of the Sanitary Code of New York City 
provides as follows: 
"No person shall throw, cast or distribute or cause or 
permit to be thrown, cast or distributed, any handbill, 
circular, card, booklet, placard or other advertising matter 
whatsoever, in or upon any street or public place, or in a 
front yard or court yard, or on any stoop, or in the vesti-
bule or any hall of any building or in a letterbox therein; 
provided that nothing herein contained shall be deemed to 
f' 
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prohibit or otherwise regulate the delivery of any such rna t-
o tel' by the United States postal service, or prohibit the dis-
tribution of sample copies of newspapers regularly sold by 
the copy or by annual subscription. This section is not in-
tended to prevent the lawful distribution of anything other 
than commercial and business advertising matter." 
7. Article II, Sec. 6 of the Park Regulations of New 
York City, provides as follows: 
"No person shall post any bill, placard, 1l0tic0 or other 
paper upon any structure, tree, rock, article or thing within 
[fo1. 5] within any park, or upon any park street, or paint 
or affix thereon, in any other way, any advertisement, no-
tice or exhortation. No person shall distribute, hand out, 
deliver, place, cast about or leave about any bill, billboard, 
ticket, handbill, card, placard, circular, pamphlet or dis-
play any flag, banner, transparency, target, sign, placard 
or any matter for advertising purposes, or operate any 
musical instrument or drum within any park or upon any 
park street, or cause any noise to be made for advertising 
purposes or for the purpose of attracting attention to any 
exhibition, pel'formance, show or other purpose, within any 
park or upon any park street. The placing, or using for 
any other purpose than reading of newspapers, or other 
papers on the beaches or boardwalks, on the lawns or 
beaches of public parks is prohibited." 
8. The l1lllawful acts of the defendant, which defendant 
threatens to repeat continuously as against the plaintiff 
and his employees and agents, violate the rights of the 
plaintiff under the following provisions of the Constitution 
and the Laws of the United States: 
(a) The provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
,Amendment to the United States Constitution that "No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, libel'ty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law::;"; 
(b) Section 1979 of the Revised Statute8, con8titutillg 
section 43 of Title 8 of the United States Code providing: 
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, 
, , 
... 
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subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 
[fo1. 6] States 01' other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof, to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable 
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress." Under these pro-
visions, basic civil liberties, including freed/om of the . 
press, are guaranteed against infringement. 
9. Plaintiff has suffered by the acts of said defendant, 
and will continue to suffer from the acts threatened by de-
fendant, serious and irreparable injury to his property and 
personal rights and immunities whereas defendant, if re-
strained as hereinafter prayed, will be enjoined merely from 
the commission of unlawful acts and will be confined to the 
lawful discharge of his duties as an officer of New York 
City, and will suffer no damage to his person or official 
rights. 
10. Plaintiff is without adequate remedy in courts of 
law because a multiplicity of arrests with appeals from con-
victions for violations of the ordinance and regulation in 
question would result in such delay that any remedy finally 
obtained would be of no help to the plaintiff, and therefore 
prays: 
(1) That the defendant, Lewis J. Valentine, individually 
and as Police Commissioner of New York City, may answer 
this bill of complaint and each statement therein made. 
(2) That the defendant and his subordinates, or any of 
them, be perpetually restrained and enjoined by the in-
junction of this court as follows: 
(a) From interfering in any manner with the plaintiff 
or his agents in the distribution by them of the handbill 
attached to persons willing to receive the same on the public 
streets and sidewalks and other public places of New York 
City. 
[fo1. 7] (b) From interfering in any manner with the 
plaintiff's employee sandwich men using the public streets 
and sidewalks and other public places in New York City. 
(3) That the defendant and his subordinates, or any of 
them, be perpetually restrained and enjoined by the injunc-
tion of this court from enforcing or attempting to enforce 
6 
the ordinances or regulations of New York City described 
in the bill of complaint, in any manner whatsoever which 
may constitute interferences of the nature 80ught to be re-
strained and enjoined in the preceding prayer. 
(4) That plaintiff may have such other and further relief 
as to this Honorable Court may be deemed just and equitable 
in the premises. 
(5) That a writ or writs of subpoena may imme command-
ing defendant to answer this bill of complaint and to abide 
by such decr'ee as this Honorable Court may make in the 
• premIses. 
Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, by V\:r alter 
W. Land, Office and Post Office Address, X o. 32 
Liberty Street, Borough of :Manhattal1, City of 
New York, Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
. , -=- ",' 
_"oc 
Pr.AINTIFF'S EXHIDIT " A' , ANNEXED TO COMPLAINT 
This exhibit constitutes a handbill which i;.l hereinafter 
reproduced as Plaintiff's Exhibit A annexed to the Agreed 
Statement of Facts at page 24 of this record. 
[fol. 8] IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT DOURT 
ANSWER 
Defendant, Lewis J. Valentine, individually and as Police 
Commissioner of New York City, fiIN; thi8, his answer, to 
the complaint herein: 
First Defense: 
1. The complaint fails to state a claim against the defend-
ant upon which relief can be granted. 
Second Defense: 
2. This Court is without jurisdiction over the Rubjcct 
matter of the controvel'sv herein . 
• 
3. Answering paragraph "1" of the complaint defend-
ant admits the allegation of diversity of citizcl18hip; lacks 
7 
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to 
the truth of the allegation that the amount in controversy 
exceeds three thousand dollars; and denies each and every 
other allegation contained therein. 
Third Defense: 
4. Defendant admits the allegations contained in para-
graphs "2", "3", "4", "6" and "7" of the complaint. 
5. Defendant admits the allegations contained in para-
graph "5" of the complaint in so far as those allegations 
are consistent with the fact that the sidewalks and streets 
therein mentioned are within Battery Park and under the 
lawful authority and jurisdiction of the Commissioner of 
Parks of New York City. . 
[foL 9] 6. Defendant repeats paragraph "3" hereof and 
further denies each and every allegation contained in para-
graphs "8", "9" and "10" of the complaint. 
Fourth Defense: 
7. Defendant repeats the admission, qualifications and 
denials set forth hereinabove in paragraphs" 3", "4", "5" 
and" 6" hereof. 
8. Defendant further alleges: 
a. The handbills (Plaintiff's Exhibit A attached to the 
complaint) and sandwich men placards mentioned in the 
complaint constitute commercial advertising matter. 
b. The plaintiff caused said handbills and placards to be 
distributed and exhibited for commercial advertising pur-
poses with the sole' or at least primary intention and motive 
of calling public attention to the place and subject matter 
of his business, so as to increase his personal pecuniary 
profits therefrom. 
Wherefore, defendant prays this Honorable Court for 
judgment dismissing the complaint herein with costs against 
the plaintiff, and for such other and further relief as may 
be deemed just and equitable in the premises. . 
William C. Chanler, Corporation Counsel, by Wil-
liam B. Trafford, Assistant Corporation Counsel, 
Attorney for Defendant, Office and Post Office Ad-
dress, Municipal Building, Borough of Manhattan, 
City of N ew York. \ 
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[fo1. 10] IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
Findings of Fact and ConclusionS! of Law 
FlhTDINGS OF F .ACT: 
(1) The amount in controversy exceeds $3,000. 
(2) The facts are further found as stipulated by the 
parties. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAw: 
(1) The freedom of speech and of the preHS secured by 
the First Amendment of the United States COllHtitutiol1 
against abridgment by the United States is similarly secured 
to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridg-
ment by a state. 
(2) The freedom of the press secured by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments confers upon the plaintiff a civil 
right, subject only to reasonable regulation, to print and 
distribute handbills such as Plaintiff's Exhibit A 01' to pre-
pare and display" sandwich men" placards containing com-
mercial 01' business advertising matter informing the public 
as to the location of his exhibit and soliciting their patron-
age. 
(3) This Court has jurisdiction over the Hubject matter 
of the controversy herein by virtue of Sections 24 (1) and 
24 (14) of the Judicial Code. 
(4) New York Health Department Regulations, Article 
ill, Section 318 (Sanitary Code, Section 318) in absolutely 
prohibiting, as disintinguished from l'eaHonably regulating 
the distribution of handbills such as Plaintiff's Exhibit A 
containing commercial or business advertising' matter if-; 
invalid and unconstitutional in that it abridges the freedom 
of the press secured by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. , 
[fo1.11] (5) New York Health Department Regulations, 
Article III, Section 318 (Sanitary Code, Section 318) in 
prohibiting the distribution of handbills such as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit A containing commercial or bu~ine8s advertising' 
matter but permitting the distribution of all other types of 
handbills is discriminatory against tbe business man and 
constitutes a deprivation of property without due process. 
(6) Defendant may be permanently enjoined from en-
forcing New York Health Department Regulatiom" Article 
9 
III, Section 318 (Sanitary Code, Section 318) against the 
plaintiff so as to prohibit the distribution by plaintiff or 
his agents, of handbills such as Exhibit A containing busi-
ness or commercial advertising. 
(7) New York Park Department Regulations, Article II, 
Section 6 is valid and, because in forbidding upon property 
under the jurisdiction of the Park Department of the City 
of N ew York the distribution of handbills such as Exhibit A 
and the display of sandwichman placards containing busi-
ness or commercial advertising, it does not abridge the free-
dom of the press secured by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
(8) Defendant may not be permanently enjoined from 
enforcing New York Park Department Regulatiolls, Article 
II, Section 6, so as to prohibit within areas under the juris-
diction vested in the Commissioner of Parks by the New 
York City Charter, on the part of plaintiff or his agents, 
(a) the distribution of commercial or business advertising 
handbills [such as Plaintiff's Exhibit A] and (b) the dis-
play of "sandwichman" placards containing commercial or 
business advertising matter. 
New York, December 13, 1940. 
Hulbert, U. S. D. J. 
[fol. 12] IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
Civil Action File No. 9 498 
• FIN AL DECREE 
• 
Final Decree Granting Permanent Injunction 
This cause having come on for trial on November 4, 1940, 
and the parties thereto having appeared by their respective 
attorneys, and the cause having been submitted to this 
Court on the agreed statement of facts of the parties for 
trial without a jury, and this Court, upon readi:ng and filing 
the complaint and answer thereto, after hearing all the evi-
dence adduced, and being fully advised in the premises 
having rendered its decision orally on November 4, 1940, 
and having filed findings of fact and conclusion of law ap-
propriate thereto, it is 
Ordered, adjudged and decreed that Section 318 of the 
Sanitary Code of the City of New York (Health Depart-
ment Reg'ulations, Article III, Section 318), insofar as it 
10 
prohibits the distribution of handbills containing commer-
cial or business advertising matter upon tmch t';treetH, Hide-
walks and public places of New York City as are not within 
the areas under the jurisdiction conferred upon the UOJl1-
missioner of Parks by the New York City Chm·ter, is Ullcon-
stitutional and invalid as applied to the distribution by 
plaintiff or his agents upon said streets, sidewalk::; and pub-
lic places of handbills, such as Plaintiff's Exhibit A in this 
cause, and the defendant and member::; of the Police Depart-
ment are hereby perpetually enjoined from interfering with 
said distribution of handbill:-; such as Plaintiff's Exhibit A, 
by the plaintiff or his agents upon said ::;h'eets, sidewalks 
and public places subject to the limitation hereinafter made 
with respect to public parks, and it is further 
Ordered, adjudged and decreed that N ew York City Park 
Department Regulations, Article il, Section 6, insofar as it 
[fol. 13] prohibits the distribution of handbills and the dis-
play of placards for advertising purposes, within Ruch areaR 
as are under the jurisdiction conferred upon the Commis-
sioner of Parks by the New York City Chartel', h~ (>om;ti-
tutional and valid, and the defendant and member::; of the 
Police Department may lawfully prevent such distribution 
(including the distribution of handbills such as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit A) within said areas and said display within said 
areas. 
Enter. Hulbert, U. S. D, J. 
December 13, 1940. 
-
[fo1. 14] IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DIS-
TRICT OF NEW YORK 
E. 9 .. · 198 
Proceedings in Open Oourt 
Before Hon. Murray Hulbert, District Judge 
N ew York, November 4, 1940; 10 :30 A. M. 
APPEARANCES: 
Winthrop, Stjmson, Putnam & Roberts, Esqrs., Attorneys 
for Plaintiff; WaIter W. Land, Esq., of Counsel. 
William C. Chanler, Esq" Corporation Counsel, Attorney 
for Defendant; W. B. Traifo"d, Esq., of Counsel. 
Mr. Land: If your Honor please, this is a case in which 
the plaintiff is seeking an llljunction against the City of 
11 
New York to prevent the enforcement of two City ordi-
nances, one, the Park ordinance, and the other, Section 318 
of the Sanitary Code. If your Honor recalls, a temporary 
order has been signed granting the plaintiff a temporary 
injunction, and we are now applying for a permanent iu-
junction to complete the case. There is no 9.ispute as to the 
facts and counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the de-
fendant have compiled an agreed statement of facts which 
we wish to submit at this time. We also have a marked 
copy of the bill of complaint in case your Honor wishes that 
(handing papers to the Court). 
[fo1.15] Mr. Trafford: Just a moment. We are agreeing 
to those facts, your Honor, with the proviso that you have 
signed the pendente lite decree which was submitted to your 
Honor last week. I have not yet seen the decree and I don't 
know, really, in what position the case is now. 
The Court: I thought I signed it. I remember signing 
the order. 
Mr. Trafford: Well then, that is quite all right, then, and 
we will--
The Court: The papers may be in the clerk's office. 
Mr. Land: I was just down there and they said the papers 
had been sent to you on October 3l. 
The Court : Well, they have. Now let us see what is here. 
Mr. Land: There should be the findings of fact. 
The Court: The findings of fact are here, and the tem-
porary injunction and the order. 
Mr. Land: That is correct. 
Mr. Trafford: May I examine them just briefly, because 
I hate to proceed without an examination. 
The Court: Surely. Here they are. There will be no 
decree until the case is finally disposed of. These are the 
findings of fact as they were signed by me. I think the other 
is a proposed finding. What is this other paper? 
Mr. Land: That is the agreed statement of facts submitted 
this morning. That is for the final decree. Would you like 
a marked bill of complaint? ,Ve have brought one. 
The Court: No, I do not need it. I have marked my own. 
Mr. Land: Are there any motions that you want either 
party to make here? We don't wish to take up your time 
unduly. 
The Court: I am not going to indicate to you what I think 
you should do in the presentation of your case. If you have 
an agreed statement of facts and that is satisfactory to both 
• 
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sides, I would naturally assume that there were no motions 
to be made. 
Mr. Land: All right. 
[fo1. 16] The Court: Except that the defendant might feel 
disposed to make a motion for a decree in his favor, upon 
the theory that even assuming the agreed statement of facts 
were true that there is no just cause for the relief which the 
plaintiff seeks. 
Mr. Trafford: That is precisely what I mean to do. 
The Court: Well, let us proceed in order then. Counsel 
for the plaintiff offers in evidence an agreed statemeJlt of 
facts dated November 4, 1940, and signed by the attorneys 
for the respective parties in this action. 
I might call your attention to the fact that the stipula-
tion, in order to comply with the rules, should bear the sig-
nature of the member of the firm. 
Mr. Trafford: Well, let us do that. 
(Agreed statement of fact signed by counsel for the re-
spective parties and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit No.1.) 
Mr. Land: Plaintiff rests. 
:MOTIONS TO DISMISS 
Mr. Trafford: At thig point the defendant moves to dig-
miss the complaint on the ground that it does not state a 
cause of action, and moves to dismiss the plaintiff'l'l case 011 
the ground that the evidence ~mbmitted does not contain 
facts sufficient to constitute a cam.:;e of action in order to 
entitle the plaintiff to legal or equitable relief. 
The Court: In what respect? 
Mr. Trafford: In respect that Section 318 of the Sanitary 
Code and Section 6 of the Park RegulatiOlls are both valid 
exercise of municipal police power and do not abridge the 
freedom of the press secured by the 1st and 14th amendment-
to the Oonstitution of the United States. 
The Oourt: So far as. Section 318 and Article 6 are con-
cerned, I will apply the same determination of law now that 
I did upon the motion for a pl'elimi11ary injunction. 
Mr. Trafford : Would you like us to submit, in accordance 
with that ruling, findings of fact and conclusions of law 1 
The Court: Well, your findings of fact and conclusions of 
law are here. 
• 
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[foL 17] Mr. Trafford: Yes. 
The Oourt: What I want to know is, outside of the 
ruling I am making with respect to the constitutionality of 
318 and the fact that I do not regard Article 6 as violated 
here, whether there is any other point upon which you desire 
to make a further motion for a dismissaL In other words, 
I want to know in what respect you claim either that the 
plaintiff has failed to make out a case on the agreed state-
ment of facts or upon the agreed statement of facts the 
Oourt is without jurisdiction to give the relief prayed for. 
Mr. Trafford: Well, I would like to make a motion on 
the further ground that ·can I make a motion in the alter-
native~ I should like to make it alternative. Upon reflec-
tion, I do not think it is necessary, but I would like to make 
the final motion that the defendant moves to dismiss the 
plaintiff's entire case on the ground that the Oourt is with-
out jurisdiction under Section 24, subsection 14 of the Ju-
dicial Oode. 
The Oourt: In what respect? 
Mr. Trafford: Because, without duplication, this Court 
has jurisdiction if there have been deprivation of a civil 
right, and it is one of those bootstrap lifting things, so I 
have to put that in. I mean if the ordinance is invalid, 
then you have jurisdiction, and vice versa. 
The Court: I think under the agreed statement of facts 
plaintiff has been deprived of a substantial right . 
• 
Mr. Trafford: The defendant also moves to dismiss the 
plaintiff's case on the ground that there has been no depri-
vation of property without due process of law, as contem-
plated under the 14th amendment of the United States Oon-
stitution. 
The Oourt: Well now, do you mean by that that there 
is a failure of proof in this case that anyone who might have 
gone to the Battery, for example, if this submarine had been 
moored there, did not go down to Pier 6 because the plain-
tiff was restrained from circulating or distributing these 
handbills and therefore he did not get notice of it, but the 
plaintiff has failed to produce on the witness stand here 
[fo1. 18] some person to show that by reason of the restraint 
which was exercised by the Police Oommissioner it lost 
a customer? 
Mr. Trafford: No, your Honor, that is not the purpose 
of that motion. It was merely this. As you understand, 
there are two aspects to this handbill legislation; one, 
14 
whether it interferes with the freedom of the pre:::K, and 
two, whether it is in any way an unrea~:;onable deprivation 
of property. The last motion is to take care of that. 
The Court: I understand your attitude to be a8 it was 
on the motion for a preliminary injunction, that where a 
handbill contains commercial advertising- and violates the 
statute, and where it contains any matter that is of an edu-
cational character designed to promote anything of that sort 
it is not violative of the statute, and if the printed matter 
which you say constitutes commercial advertising were not 
on there, then there would be 110 objection to that handbill. 
Mr. Trafford! None whatsoever. It i:; just like theRe 
election handbills you see all around. 
The Court: I adhere to my previous determination that, 
as I read the law now, that it has been extensively inter-
preted by the decisions of the United State:; Supreme Court, 
and there is no distinction between one kind of advertisinp; 
and the other. 
Mr. Trafford: That is: between commercial and non-
commercial advertising? 
The Court: Yes, except that they do that in accordance 
with the limitations that have been indieatecl bv decisions 
• 
and which have been followed by the City of Philadelphia 
in the case that I cited in my memorandum. The City 
cannot be restrained from a reasonable exercise and control 
over its streets, but neither can it, by a broad ordinance, 
exclude all forms of circularizing by handbill under all cir-
cumstances. Well, the motions are denied. 
Mr. Trafford: I will have to make one further motion. 
The Oourt: All right. 
Mr. Trafford: That is that Section 318 of the Sanitarv 
• [fo1. 19] Code and Section 6 of the Park RegulationI' may 
constitutionally be applied to the particular double-face 
handbill which is the subject matter of this litigation and 
therefore plaintiff's case should be dismissed. 
The Court: I am going to hold it as I did on the motion 
for a preliminary injunction that so far aB the diBtribution 
of handbills in the park, that cannot be done, and that so 
far as the use of sandwich-men signs, so-called, l1eitber may 
that be done in the park or upon the streets adjacent to 
and which are within the jurisdiction of the Park Commis-
sioner, but that so far as the streets and avenues are con-
cerned, under the broad language of Section 318, its appli-
cation upon the facts as set forth in the agreed statement 
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in this case is, in my opinion, invalid and unenforceable) 
and a decree may be entered accordingly. 
Mr. Land: You will not wish to have conclusions of law 
re-submitted then for the final decree; we will just submit 
the decree for signature? 
The Court : Your findings and conclusions are all in here, 
I take it. 
Mr. Land: The agreed statement of facts that we handed 
up this morning does not go into the law, your Honor. 
There hav~ been, of course, conclusions of law submitted 
previously in connection with the temporary injunction. 
The Court : No, you will have to have conclusions made 
in your order the foregoing findings and conclusions and 
you specify or distinguish between the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. All you need is a decree to carry into 
effect the findings of fact and conclusions of law as agreed 
upon by yourselves. 
Mr. Trafford: If your Honor please, to correct the rec-
ord, we agree only to the form and not the substance of 
those conclusions of law. 
The Court : Well, I am finding them as to the facts and 
I am also making the conclusion that you have agreed upon 
as to form. 
Mr. Trafford: All right. 
, 
[fol. 20] PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1 
Civil Action File No. 9 498 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW 
YORK 
F. J. CHRESTENSEN, PlOJintijf, 
against 
LEWIS J. VALENTINE, Individually and as Police Commis-
sioner of New York City, Defendant 
AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Whereas this Court, upon plaintiff's motion for a pre-
liminary injunction in the above entitled action, has rendered 
its decision dated August 26, 1940, made findings of fact 
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and conclusions of law, and entered an order thereon grant-
ing plaintiff's motion in part and denying it in part; and 
"\Vhel'eas there is no dhqmte between the parties UH to 
the facts of the case. 
Now, Therefore, the undersigned, attorneys for the rt'-
spective parties, hereby agree to the following statement 
of facts: 
1. Plaintiff, a citizen of Florida, owns and maintains 
for the purposes of exhibition to the public at a Jix('c1 ac1m1H-
sion fee the former U. S. Na\'V submarine "S,49." 
• 
2. Defendant, a citizen of New York, iH the duly ap-
pointed and acting Police Commissioner of New York City. 
[fol. 21J 3. New York City Health Department Regula-
tions, Article ill, Sec. 318 (Sanitary Code, Sec. 31S), he1't'1n-
after caned the health regulation, provideH at-l follows: 
"Handbills, cards and circulars. No person shall throw, 
cast or distribute, or cause or permit to bt' thrown, cat-lt 
or distributed, any handbill, circular, carel, booklet, placard 
or other advertising matter whatHo('"'\'er in or upon any 
street or public place, or in a front yard or court yard, or on 
any stoop, or in the vestibule or any hall of any building, 
or in a letter box therein; provided, that nothing herein 
contained shall be deemed to prohibit or otherwise regu-
late the delivery of any such matter by the United States 
. postal service, or prohibit the distribution of sample copies 
of newspapers regularly sold by the copy or by annual 
subscription. This section is not intended to prevent the 
lawful distribution of anything other than commercial and 
business advertising matter." 
4. New York City Park Departmeut RegulationR, Ar-
ticle II, Sec. 6, hereinafter called the park regulation, pro-
vides as follows: 
"Advertising and littering' prohibited.- No perRon Rhall 
post any bill, placard, notice or other paper upon any 
structure, tree, rock, article or thing' within any park, or 
upon any park street, or paint or affix therein, in any other 
way, any advertisement, notice or exhortation. No p<'>l't-lon 
shall distribute, hand out, deliver, place, caRt about or lea"e 
about any bill, billboard, ticket, handbill, carel, placard, 
circular, pamphlet or display any flag-, banner, transpareucy, 
target, sign, placard or any matter for advertising pur-
-
• 
17 
poses, or operate any musical instrument or drum within 
a:ny park or upon any park stl'eet, or cause any noises to be 
made for advertising purposes or for the purpose of at-
[fol. 22] trading attention to any exhibition, performance, 
show or other purpose, within any park or upon any park 
street. The placing, or using for any other purpose than 
reading of newspapers, or other papers on the beaches 
or boardwalks, on the lawns or beaches of public parks, 
is prohibited," 
5. Defendant, or his agents, by threatening to enforce 
the health regulation against plaintiff, has restrained plain-
tiff from distributing in the streets and other public places 
of the City of New York, copies of a certain handbill, here-
inafter called handbill A, a copy of which is attached to the 
Bill of Complaint and marked "Plaintiff's Exhibit A," and 
a copy of which is also attached hereto and likewise marked 
"Plaintiff's Exhibit A," and by this reference made a part 
hereof. 
6. Handbill A bears on the face thereof commercial or 
business advertising matteI' informing the public of the loca-
tion of plaintiff's exhibit and soliciting their patronage. 
7. The reverse side of handbill A contains, not commer-
cial or business advertising matter, but rather a public pro-
test against the conduct of the New York City Department 
of Docks in denying plaintiff wharfage facilities at piers 
owned by New York City and situated at the Battery. 
8. Plaintiff had earlier, on or about .June 29, 1940, pre-
pared a handbill, hereinaftel' called handbill No.1, a copy 
of which is attached hereto and marked "Defendant's Ex-
hibit 1" and by this reference made a part hereof. The de-
fendant, or his agents, informed the plaintiff that the dis-
tribution of handbill No.1 would be a violation of the park 
and health regulations but that plaintiff could distribute 
handbills which contained only information or a public pro-
test. Plaintiff thereupon revised handbill No.1 by removing 
from the face of it certain advertising matter and by print-
ing on the reverse side of the handbill a public protest, 
[fol. 23] which revised handbill is handbill A. On being 
shown a printer's proof of handbill A, defendant, or his 
agents, advised plaintiff that the protest matter on the re-
verse side thereof could be distributed without police re-
straint, if separated from the commercial advertising matter 
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remaining on the face thereof. Plaintiff caused handbill A 
to be printed with the said protest matter appearing on 
the reverse side thereof, and has not attempted to distribute 
said protest matter disassociated from said commercial ad-
vertising matter. Defendant, or his agents, restrained the 
plaintiff from distributing handbill A, as described in pal'a-
g'raphs 5 and 9 hereof, and plaintiff thereupon brought this 
action. 
9. Defendant by threatening to enforce the park rep:u-
lation against plaintiff has restrained plaintiff from display-
ing "sandwichman" placards and from distributinp: copies 
of handbill A upon streets and sidewalks adjacent and con-
tiguous to the central area of Battery Park, but within the 
jurisdiction of the Commjssioner of Parks and possibly 
within the borders of the various tracts of land dedicated 
for park purposes in the Battery Park area. 
10. The restraints described in paragraphs 5 and 9 hereof 
have resulted, and their continuance will result, in a dim-
inution of the number of persons paying fees for admission 
to plaintiff's submarine. The net profits which plaintiff 
would realize in the absence of said restraints exceed the 
sum of three thousand dollars ($3,000). 
Dated, November 4, 1940. 
Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, Attorneys 
for Plaintiff, By Walter W. Land. William C. 
Chanler, Corporation Counsel, AttornE'y for De-
fendant, by William B. Trafford. 
(Here follow 3 photolithographs, side folios 24-26) 
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It is almod unbelievable that a _t;ity governed by a mayor who is one cf the outstanding liberal$ 
of the United States, a man noted for his square dealing and belief in impartiality in the affain of 
• g.overnment, should have a subordinate who acts in a dictatorial manner and draws a distinction 
as to what ships will be allowed to dock in the City of New York at piers whiclr are under his control. 
.. 
The Submarine S·49 has been .e~hibited at municipal piers in Baltimore, Philadelphia, Newark, 
Chicago, Cleveland, Buffalo and many others. Every municipal dock department that I have come 
in contact with was not only willing, but anxious, to assist me in securing the best availllble docking 
facilities for the convenience of the people of their city who wished to visit this subm<'lrine. To find a 
dock commissioner who apsolutery refused me docking space ot city owned piers such as tho Battery 
Park and the adjoir!ng Pier I A, not only in the summer but in November as well, when there were no 
boats using any of these.loca.fio~ anclat a time when it would have moant a substantial revenue to 
fhe city, seems unbelieveable. 
The reason given me by the Commissioner'$ secretary was that they had refusod permi:~i. 
for other boats to tie up at city owned docn for the purpose of operating as night dub~, 
'resta~rantS' and dance hailS'. This comparison is, of course, ridiculous, as this type of businoss could be 
established just 0$· well in any of the hundreds of idle buildings throughout the city. In the elise of this 
submarihe, it is entirely different as this is the exh ibition of a ship which cannot bo shown oxcept dt 
II doc~, as this is the only submarine used for exhibition purposes in the entire world. There is no 
other opportunity for the people to see one. Especially at this time, it is of on intense int~rest to the 
, 
general public because of the. biJr\Dns of doUaI$. which they are willingly paying in tIlXO' to build 
up the greatest navy in the world, they are: mote: deeply interested in seeing the way those ships 
ere constructed. Dock Commi$$loner- McKemie- ha£ deprived- the- people of Now York City of the 
opportunity d£ seeing. this submarine as far as' he has been abrA, and it is my opinion that he 
haS' acted contrary to the personal interest of the people and the finencilll interest of the city. If 
these docks were Mr. McKenzie's personel property, he would have tha right to refuse to accept 
rental for them. But as an agent for the ciiy, iheems strange that he should refuse the income 
of several hundred dollars a month for docks that were idle. 
It is only because of the fact thot the State of New York is allowing me the use of Pier 5 
fhe East River th<'lt the people of New York are now able to see this submarine, While not as 
convient for the visitors as Battery Pork, by following the diagram on the other side of this paper, 
it may be reached in about two (2) minutes. 
CAPT. F. J. CHRESTENSEN, 
Exhibitor of the former 
U. S. Navy Submorine S·~9 25 
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[foL 27] IN UNITED STATES DISTRIOT COURT 
NOTICE OF ApPEAL 
SIRS: 
Please take notice that the defendant hereby appeals 
to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Cir-
cuit, from so much of the final decree, entered herein in the 
office of the Clerk of the United States District Court, Sou-
thern District of New York, on or about the 14th day of 
December, 1940, as provides as follows: 
"it is 
Ordered, adjudged and decreed that section 318 of the 
Sanitary Code of the City of New York (Health Depart-
ment Regulations, Article III, section 318), in so far as it 
prohibits the distribution of handbills containing commer-
cial or business advertising matter upon such streets, side-
walks and public places of New York City as are not 
within the areas under the jurisdiction conferred upon the 
Commissioner of Park by the New York Oity Charter, is 
unconstitutional and invalid as applied to the distribution 
by plaintiff or his agents upon said streets, sidewalks and 
public places of handbills, such as Plaintiff's Exihibit A in 
this cause, and the defendant and members of the Police 
Department are hereby perpetually enjoined from inter-
fering with said distribution of handbills such as Plaintiff's 
Exhibit A, by the plaintiff or his agents upon said streets, 
sidewalks and public places subject to the limitation here-
[foL 28] inafter made with respect to public parks." 
Dated, March 8, 1941. 
Yours, etc., William C. Ohanler, Oorporation Coun-
sel, Attorney for Defendant, Office & P. O. Address, 
Municipal Building, Borough of Manhattan, New 
York Oity. 
To: Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, Esqs., Attor-
neys for Plaintiff, 32 Liberty Street, New York City. 
-- --, Clerk of the United States District Oourt, 
Southern District of New York. 
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[fol. 29] IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT OOURT 
STIPULATION SETTLING CASE 
It is hereby stipulated and agreed that the foreg'oing i:-< 
a true transcript of the record of the said District Court in 
the above entitled action and that the Clerk may :-;0 certify. 
Dated, N ew York, May 16th, 1941. 
Winthrop, Stjmson, Putnam & Roberts, Attorneys 
for Plaintiff. William C. Chanler, Corporation 
Counsel, Attorney for Defendant. 
Clerk's Certificate to foregoing tram~cript omitted in 
printing . 
• 
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[fo1. 30] UNITED STATES OIRCUIT OOURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
SECOND CIRCUIT, OCTOBER TERM, 1940 
Argued June 13, 1941. Decided July 25, 1941 
No. 358 
F. J. CHRESTENSEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
LEWIS J. VAIiENTINE, individually and as Police Oommis-
sioner of New York Oity, Defendant-Appellant 
Appeal from the District Oourt of the United States for 
the Southern District of N ew York 
Action by F. J. Ohrestensen against Lewis J. Valentine, 
individually and as police commissioner of New York Oity, 
to enjoin enforcement against plaintiff of New York City 
Sanitary Oode, §318, prohibiting the distribution of hand-
bills. From a final decree perpetually enjoining enforce-
ment of the regulation as against plaintiff, defendant ap-
peals. ' 
See, also, D. O. S. D. N. Y., 34 F. Supp. 596. 
Affirmed. 
Before: Swan, Clark and Frank, Oircuit Judges. 
• 
[fo1. 31] Walter W. Land, of New York City (Winthrop, 
Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, of New York Oity, on the 
brief), for plaintiff-appellee. 
William S. Gaud, Jr., Asst. Oorp. Counsel, of New York 
City (William O. Ohanler, Corp. Oounsel, and Paxton Blair 
and William B. Trafford, Asst. Oorp. Oounsel, all of New 
York Oity, on the brief), for defendant-appellant. 
Olark, Oircuit Judge: 
This case presents another aspect of the much litigated 
question as to the validity of municipal prohibitions against 
the distribution of handbills in streets and public places. 
Lovell v. Oity of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 58 S. Ot. 666, 82 
L. Ed. 949; Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 
U. S. 147, 60 S. Ot. 146, 84 L. Ed. 155; Hague v. C. 1. 0., 
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307 U. S. 496, 518, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423. The pro-
hibition here involved is found in New York City Sanitary 
Code, §318 (Health Department Regulations, Art. ill, ~318), 
but with a saving sentence limiting its application to "com-
mercial and business advertising matter." Upon tbis limi-
tation the defendant city police commissioner rests his case 
herein, since he regards plaintiff's handbills as commercial 
advertising. But on application for an injunction pendente 
lite, the district court held the regulation -entirely invalid 
in an opinjon reported in 34 F. Supp. 596, though not of 
record here, notwithstanding Federal Rule 75(g). And after 
a hearing on the merits wherein the facts were stipulated, 
the court entered its decree perpetually enjoining defendant 
from emorcing the regulation as against distribution of 
plaintiff's handbills. This appeal followed. .A further C011-
[fol. 32] tention involving a city park regulation was de-
cided adversely to plaintiff and is not the subject of ap-
peal. 
Plaintiff, a citizen of Florida, is the owner of the former 
U. S. Navy Submarine S-49, "a $2,000,000 fighting mon-
ster, " as his handbill asserts. He has exhibited this sub-
marine in various cities, and in 1940 applied to the City for 
permission to dock at city-owned docks off Battery Parle 
This was refused, apparently because permission had been 
denied other boats to operate as night clubs, restaurants, 
and dance halls. Plaintiff then secur-ed permission to dock 
at a state-owned pier in the East River and thereupon pre-
pared handbills to advertise the submarine as docked at 
Pier 5, East River, two minutes away from Batt-ery Park. 
This draft of handbill was a direct bid for pa tronag·c. It 
{lontained a cut of the submarine, a statement that compe-
tent guides would take a person from one end of it to the 
other, insistent directions to see several featured points-
the torpedo compartment, the sleeping quarters, the kitchen, 
and fually "See how men live in a Hell Diver" and a 
schedule of "popular prices" (adults 251 and children 15¢). 
Defendant or hi~ agents having informed plaintiff that dis-
tribution of this handbill would be illegal, but that bills con-
tainjng only information or a public protest could be dis-
tributed, plaintiff revised his material to the form which is 
the subject matter of this suit. 
In its fual form mucl1 of the material of the first hand-
bill was preserved; included was the cut of the submarine 
-
-
32 23 
and the map showing the approach to Pier 5 in the East 
River opposite Battery Park; but elided were all.ref.erences 
to the sale of tickets or the price thereof. In place of the 
schedule of prices appeared the statement, "The only sub-
marine used for exhibition in the world"; instead of the 
insistent commands to "see" the described points of in ter-
est were only the drab statements that" Submarine S-49 
contains" the torpedo compartment, the sleeping quarters, 
[fo1. 33] the kitchen, etc.; and the invitation to see life in a 
hell diver vanished entirely. On the reverse side of this 
bill appeared four paragraphs of rather closely spaced 
type, over plaintiff's name as "Exhibitor of the former 
U. S. Navy Submarine S-49" and under the title, "Sub-
marine Refused Permission To Dock At Any Oity Owned 
Pier By Oommissioner of Docks McKenzie." Herein ap-
peared a spirited protest against the' , almost unbelievable" 
action of "dictatorial" subordinates of "a mayor who is 
one of the outstanding liberals of the United States" in 
refusing plaintiff permission to tie up to city-owned piers, 
contrary to his treatment in many other named cities. The 
protest concluded with the statement that it was only be-
cause the State of New York allowed plaintiff the use of 
Pier 5 in the East River that the people of New York were 
now able to see this submarine. "While not as convenient 
for the visitors as Battery Park, by following the diagram 
on the other side of this paper, it may be reached in about 
two (2) minutes." 
Defendant's agents, being shown a printer's proof of this 
handbill, still asserted its illegality, but told plaintiff that 
the protest appearing on its reverse side could be distri-
buted without police restraint if separated from" the com-
mercial advertising matter" remaining on the face. Plain-
tiff nevertheless caused the handbill to be printed, defendant 
restrained its distribution, and plaintiff brought this action 
for an injunction. Jurisdiction rests upon diversity of 
citizenship of the parties, there being more than $3,000 in-
volved, and also upon the deprivation of a constitutional 
right. 28 U. S. O. A. §41 (1) and (14); Hague v. O. I. 0., 
supra. 
Defendant's claim is that the face of the handbill con-
stituted commercial or business advertising matter within 
the interdiction of the city ordinance or regulation. This 
enactment in some analogous form goes back for many 
years. In 1938, it was transmuted into the present health 
24 
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[fol. 34] department regulation, and the important second 
or final sentence was added to make the entire provision 
read as follows: . 
"Handbills, cards antI ci't"C'Zitla'ts. No perf'i.on shall throw, 
cast or distribute, or cause or permit to be thrown, cast or 
distributed, any handbill, circular, card, booklet, placard 
or other advertising matter whatsoever, in 01' upon any 
street or public place, or in a front yard or court yard, or 
on any stoop, or in the vestibule or any hall of any building, 
or in a letter box therein; provided, that nothing herein con-
tained shall be deemed to prohibit or otherwise regulate the 
delivery of any such. matter by the United State!:'! po~tal 
service, or prohibit the distribution of sample copies of 
newspapers regularly sold by the copy or by annual sub-
scription. This section is not intended to prevent the law-
ful distribution of anything other than commercial and 
business advertising matter." 
Without the last sentence, either expressed 01' implied, 
it seems quite clear that the regulation is invalid under the 
Supreme Court cases cited, as abridging the freedom of 
speech and of the press secured against state invasion by 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Since the 
claimed purpose of the regulation is to protect public health 
by preventing the littering of streets, it might be doubted 
whether the regulation thus truncated accomplishes enough 
to be worth savjng. The city officials, however, support the 
regulation as limited, on the ground that partial prevention 
of street littering is better than none at alP Moreover, 
[fol.35] they view the 1938 limitation as merely embody-
ing previous state judicial rulings and as brlllging about a 
discriminating type of handbill regulation which iH wit11in 
the Suprem-e Court precedents. 
-
1 It is suggested- rather blithely, we think that com-
mercial handbills will cause more street litter than 11011-
commercial, as more quickly discarded- -thus assuming- that 
the public is more interested in political and religious dis-
cussion than in commercial bargains or amusement notices. 
Of., however, Milwaukee v. Kassen, 203 Wis. 383, 383, 234 
N. W. 352; People v. Young, 33 Cal. ApI). 2d 747, 85 P. 
2d 231; 39 Mich. L. Rev. 561, 589; but see Cou?;hlin v. 
Sullivan, 100 N. J. L. 42, 126 A. 177. 
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So far as State judicial history is concerned, there is 
authority for their position, although, as we view it, rather 
less persuasive or compelling than their argument presup-
poses. The prohibition seems to have been pretty thor-
oughly upheld in the early case of People v. Horwitz, 27 
N. Y. Cr. R. 237, 140 N. Y. S. 437, 1912, although in People 
v. Lookstein, 78 Misc. 306, 139 N. Y. S. 680, a conviction of 
the person furnishing the circulars as an abettor was re-
versed. In 1921, however, in p.eople v. Johnson, 117 Misc. 
133, 191 N. Y. S. 750, the court upheld the ordinance only 
by restricting it to commercial advertising and actually dis-
missed the complaint against the then defendant. There-
after, until the recent case of People v. La Rollo, 24 N. Y. 
S. 2d 350, this regulation and similar city ordinances seem 
regularly to have been set aside, at least as to the persons 
actually before the court, with or without suggestion of the 
distinction made in the Johnson case. See Estey v. Cole- I 
man, 174 Misc. 780, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 829; City of Rochester v. 
Parr, 165 Misc. 182, 1 N. Y. S. 2d 771; People ex reI. Gor-
don v. McDermott, 169 Misc. 743, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 795·; People 
v. Ribinovich, 171 Misc. 569, 13 N. Y. S. 2d 135; People v. 
De Julis, 174 Misc. 836, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 995.2 A regulation 
requiring a license to sell merchandis-e was held invalid as 
applied to pamphlets in People v. Banks, 168 Misc. 515, 6 N. 
Y. S. 2d 41, not applicable to pamphlets in People v. Finkel-
[fo1. 36] stein, 170 Misc. 188, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 941, and valid 
as to song sheets, which were "ess-entially commercial" 
publications, in People v. Samuels, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 113. In 
Walters v. Valentine, 172 Misc. 274, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 612, 
Justice McCook held invalid a regulation prohibiting adver-
tising by sandwich men, but excepting pickets, ev·en against 
the City's suggested distinction between commercial and 
noncommercial advertising. 
2 There seem also to have been several unreported de-
cisions of like tenor. People ex reI. Horan v. H~rry Goren, 
Mag. Ct., N. Y. C., 1935, 4 I. J. A. Bull., No.3, p. 3; City of 
New Rochelle v. McCormick, City Ct., New Rochelle, 1935, 
4 Westchester L. J. 99; People v. Lorenz & Ross, Mag. Ct., 
N. Y. C., 1933, 1 I. J. A. Bull., No. 12, p. 2. See, also, 3 
ibid. No.3, pp. 1, 2, No.6, p. 3, No. 11, p. 2, No. 12, p. 2; 4 
ibid. No.3, p. 2; 5 ibid. 147-151 ; 6 ibid. 103 ; People v. Black, 
135 Misc. 841, 241 N. Y. S. 756; People v. Holo-stein, 150 
Misc. 101, 268 N. Y. S. 50. 
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Finally, after the decision below, ca.me People v. La Rollo, 
supra, where the city magistrate did accept the distinction 
between commercial and noncommercial advertising as 
ground for upholding the present form of § 318. The court 
took pains, however, to distinguish our case here as on the 
border line between commercial advertising and protest, 
and hence not applicable to the case then before it. 
With such a record of uncertainty as to the validity and 
effect of the regulation, with the further necessity ad-
verted to below· .. , .. of making refined distinctions between 
circulars "primarily" commercial or otherwise and enter-
prises entered into "primarily" for commercial purposes 
to sustain the regulation and make it workable, the able 
Corporation Counsel and his skilled staff might well have 
paused before attempting to sustain only the remnant!:' of 
the original prohibitory scheme; or might well have pre-
ferred to try their hand at the devising of an ordinance 
"narrowly drawn" (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 
307, 311, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213) to secure at once 
the legitimate objectives of the City without the chance 
of infringing on the cherished constitutional rights of the 
individual. That the city officers chose nevertheless to 
apply the regUlation as against the plaintiff is due, we think 
to a failure to accord due force to all the several rulings 
in Schneider v. State, supra. 
After the decision in Lovell v. City of Griffin, supra, four 
state courts of high authority proeeeded to uphold ol'cli-
nances involving handbills on various gronnd~, in earb case 
[fol. 37] c1istinp,'uishing Lovell v. City of Griffin. Three of 
these decisions involved prohibition against the distribu-
tion of handbills; while one concerned the regulation of 
canvassing and soliciting'. This difference in the cases is 
important to an understanding of Schneider v. State, supra, 
which reversed all four cases. Of tll(~ three handbill cases, 
the most importa:nt here is the reversal of People Y. Young, 
supra, for involved in that case was a ]landbill giving a 
notice of a meeting under the auspices of "Friends Lincoln 
Brigade," at which speakers were to discuss the war in 
Spain. On the handbill were the words ".A.dmi[o;sion 25¢ 
and 50¢." The state court said of this, as quoted by the 
Supreme Court, 308 U. S. at page 165, n. 3: "WhateYel' 
traffic in ideas the Friends Lincoln Brigade may have 
planned for the meeting, the cards themselves seem to fall 
within the classification of commercial advertising rather 
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than the expression of one's views. But if this be so, our 
conclusion is not thereby changed." When, however, the 
Supreme Oourt rendered its decision in the handbill cases, 
it pointed out that none of them purported "to license dis-
tribution but all of them absolutely prohibit it in the streets 
and, one of them, in oiher public places as well." 308 U. S. 
at page 162. It was held that "the purpose to keep the 
streets clean and of good appearance· is insufficient to justify 
an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public 
street from handing literature to one willing to receive it," 
that' I there are obvious methods of preventing littering," 
such as punishment of those who actually throw papers on 
the street, and that all the ordinances were invalid. Hence 
it seems clear that a handbill containing advertising matter, 
even, a schedule of admission charges, is not in itself ren-
dered outside the pale of protection against such an absolute 
and complete prohibition. 
The fourth case involved an ordinance of the Oity of 
Irvington, New Jersey, carefully drawn to protect and li-
[foL 38] cense the privilege of canvassing and soliciting. It 
was" not limited to those who canvass for private profit," 
but required generally a submission to the judgment of a 
police officer as to granting of the permit, fingerprinting, 
photographing, and so on.3 The court held .this ordinance 
invalid as against the petitioner, a member of Jehovah's 
Witnesses, who was distributing tracts. It went on to say, 
308 U. S. at page 165: "We are not to be taken as holding 
that commercial soliciting and canvassing may not be sub-
jected to such regulation as the ordinance requires. Nor 
do we hold that the town may not:fix reasonable hours when 
canvassing may be done by persons having such objects as 
the petitioner. Doubtless there are other features of such 
activities which may be regulated in the public interest with-
out prior licensing or other invasion of constitutional 
liberty. " 
Moreover, the Oourt now made express what previous de-
cisions had implied, namely, that the explicit constitutional 
protection accorded freedom of expression made support of 
the legislative preference less imperativeT but that, indeed, 
"the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the 
3 See, also, the opinions below, Town of Irvington v. 
Schneider, 120 N. J. L. 460, 200 A. 799, affirmed 121 N. J. L. 
542, 3 A. 2d 609. 
• 
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challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or be-
liefs respecting' matters of public convenience may well 
support regulation directed at other personal activities, but 
be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of 
rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institu-
tions." 308 U. S. at page 161; see 40 Col. L. Rev. 531. 
This admonition is repeated in almost identic- words in 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 95, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 
L. Ed. 1093, while the different rule applicable where more 
jmportant sovereign rights are involved is contrasted in 
the "flag salute" case, Minersville School District v. Go-
bitis, 310 U. S. 586, 595, 60 S. Ct. 1010, 84 L. Ed. 1375. In 
[fo1. 39] the latter case the court, referring to the interest 
there involved, national lmity, which was the basig of na-
tional security, said: "To deny the legislature the right 
to select appropriate means for its attainment presents a 
totally di fferent order of problem from that of the pro-
priety of subordinating the possible ugliness of littered 
streets to the free expression of opinion through distribu-
tion of handbills. Compare Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 
147." See, also, Cox v. New Hampshire, 61 S. C. 762. 
We think, therefore, that interpretation of the conclusions 
of the Schneider case is not doubtful. Absolute prohibi-
tion of expression "in the market place" is megal, not 
to be saved by any commercial taint attached to tbe ex-
pression; reasonable regulation of soliciting, not prev('nt-
ing freedom of expression, is permissible.4 And in the 
latte:r case, where the soliciting is for profit, gteps to id('n-
tify, even to license, the solicitor may be upheld to prevent 
fraud upon or inconvenience to tbe public. (Note that tbis 
distinction between forms of solicitation may be made clear, 
definite, and workable, since it has a common-sense purpose 
in mind and deals with reg'Ulation, not pl'obibition j Witll it 
may be contrasted the distinctions hereinafter discussed.) 
And borderline cases are to be resolved not in favor of the 
regulation, but in favor of the cherished rigbt. 
To avoid the conclusion to which this reasoning neces-
sarily points, defendant suggests a different interpretation 
of the governing' precedents, resting upon certain assump-
4 Of. 8 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 866, 868 i 28 Geo. L. J. 649 j 
53 Harv. L. Rev. 487; 8 I. J. A. Bull. 566, 567; 14 St. John's 
L. Rev. 401. Other law review comments are noted in 
note 5, below. 
• 
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tions and distinctions which he presses with vigor. First 
to meet the issue that handbills containing at least some 
advertising matter have been protected, he 'sug'gests that 
the prohibit.ion does not apply unless the handbill is "pri-
marily" commercial. On this ground he distinguishes 
[fol. 40] People v. Taylor, 33 Cal. App. 2d 760, 85 P. 2d 
978, for there the circular supported as against the San 
Diego ordinance did contain advertising matter of sub-
scriptions to, a daily paper, of books and pamphlets, and 
of a book store but it was a "publication of a radical but 
not incendiary nature, mainly devoted to political discus-
sion but containing certain advertising matter," 33 Cal. 
App. 2d at page 762. Again, it is suggested that a com-
mercial advertisement is to be distinguished from a non-
commercial advertisement or matter "exclusively or pri-
marily calculated to attract the attention and patronage 
of the public to a non-commercial enterprise, i.e., one en-
tered into primarily for considerations other than pecu-
niary gain." On this basis the Los Angeles handbill con-
sidered in Schneider v. State, supra, is denominated non-
commercial. And so also are distinguished other cases 
holding broadly that such handbill ordinances are illegal. 
People v. Armstrong', 73 Mich. 288, 41 N. W. 275, 2 L. R. A. 
721, 16 Am. St. Rep. 578; City of Chicago v. Schultz, 341 
Ill. 208, 173 N. E. 276. Still other precedents are distin-
guished as applying merely to ordinances entirely vague 
or discriminatory against certain kinds of advertising only. 
Cleveland Shopping News Co, v. City of Lorain, 37 Ohio 
L. R. 527, 13 Ohio Abs. 265; In re Thornburg, 55 Ohio App. 
229, 9 N. E. 2d 516; Ex parte Johns, 129 Tex. Cr. R. 487, . 
88 S. W. 2d 709; Ex parte Pierce, 127 Tex. Cr. R. 35, 75 
S. W. 2d 264. Thus a rather impressive array of judicial 
precedents is put aside, once we accept the assumptions 
urged upon us. 
Perhaps we can pass the fact that the distinctions argued 
for are not explicitly stated in either legislation 01' decision 
(except perhaps in People v. La Rollo, supra), since the 
necessity of drawing lines, of making narrow distinctions, 
is so usual a part of interpretation and adjudication. But 
we still have the question as to the reasonable and rational 
consequences of the particular location of the line and how 
[fo1. 41] well it effectuates the objectives to be subserved or 
balances the opposing policies. And at once we are faced 
2 707 
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''lith the question, How much is "primarily"1 i( P,·ima.rily 
commercial" presumably signifies a test quantitative in 
amount; a limited dross of commercialism does not vitiate, 
though a more substantial amount may, and pre::mmably 
will. In contrast, however, when we turn to the other as-
sumed definition, we must presumably weigh motives or in-
tent to determine the non-commercial nature of an enter-
prise "primarily for considerations other than pecuniary 
gain. " In net result the police officers administerillp,' the 
regUlation are to be arbiters just as they undertook to be 
here of the quantum of advertising as against prote!:lt and 
of the purpose of the citizen in speaking and writing. The 
test seems to be therefore both objective and Rubjective, 
though, as defendant concedes, the Supreme Court decisionR , 
above cited "have shifted the initial constitutional inquiry 
from abstract' aim' to concrete operation." If the police 
are to weigh purpose and intent, as well as the effeet of the 
literary product, "concrete operation" here will pretty 
surely result in prohibiting freedom of expression in ways 
and to an extent quite unconnected with problem:; of city 
sanitation.o 
Plaintiff's handbill furnishes a good example of the un-
certainty, not to speak of unreality, of the suggested diR-
tinctions. Sheer number of words favors the protest as 
against all the rest of the handbill, whether it be conRidel'ed 
[fo1. 42] advertising or mere factual information concern-
ing the submarine. Spacing and display give at least equal 
place to the protest. But if intent and purpose must be 
6 Criticism of the suggested "commercial" distinction is 
made in 5 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 675, 676; but in 35 Ill. L. Rev. 
90, 94, the subjective nature of the test "ascertainiup; tbe 
principal purpose intended by the distributor in each 
case"-.. is thought capable of accomplishment IIwitbout 
great difficulty." For comments discussing somewhat the 
suggested distinction, see, also, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 570; 13 So. 
Calif. L. Rev. 253; 25 Wash. U. L. Q. 611; Lindsay, Council 
and Court; the Handbill Ordinances, 1889-1939, 39 Mich. L. 
Rev. 561, 580, 589, 593. It seems not referred to in many 
notes, 40 Col. L. Rev. 531; 1 Bill of Rights Rev. 53; ef. 15 
Ind. L. J. 312; 6 Mo. L. Rev. 103, while still others point out 
that the Schneider case appears to invalidate absolute })1'0-
hibition of even commercial circulars; see reviews cited, 
note 4, above. 
• 
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measuredr how can we say that plaintiff's motives are only 
or primarily financial ~ 6 Is he just engaged in an advertis-
ing plot, or does he really believe in his wrongs ~ We know 
how opposition to oppression, real or fancied, grows upon a 
person, and we can suspect that by now plaintiff regards 
himself as a crusader against injustice. If so, he is in the 
democratic tradition and within the protection of the Bill 
of Rights, which safeguards the right of the individual even 
more than that of the group or party. Indeed, we think it is 
a misconception of the great freedom here involved to hold 
it more applicable to group protest for abstract religious or 
political principle than to individual protests for concrete 
business injuries. Not such was the attitude of the found-
ing fathers; was it not against a tax on tea that one of our 
most cherished blows for freedom was struck~ Of course, 
we recognize the need, as well as the common sense, of dis-
tinguishing between profit-making and nonprofit-making 
activities for many relevant matters, as in use of the mails, 
levy of customs duties, and other similar examples which 
defendant cites to us. But we think it is quite a different 
thing to say that expression in p.ublic places by handbill or 
circular must be, not regulated, but forbidden to the busi-
ness man who would make a protest against official mistreat-
[fol. 43] ment of himself in his business affairs. Not such, 
as we understand it, is the interpretation of the constitu-
G Some point is made of the stipulated fact that the hand-
bill "bears' on the face thereof commercial or business ad-
vertising matter informing the public of the location of 
plaintiff's exhibit and soliciting their patronage," as per-
haps putting plaintiff out of court on his own admission. 
This, however, does not purport to be a reflection of plain-
tiff's mind, but only an interpretation of the document, 
which, being before us, we can read for ourselves. It il-
lustrates the difficulties of characterization which refine-
ments of definition compeL For the handbill informs the 
public of the location of the exhibit, but nowhere directly 
solicits patronage; that is the reader's deduction as to the 
writer's intent. Should prohibition of expression rest upon 
the drawing of such inferences ~ Note, further, that the pro-
test itself, which the police officers were willing to accept, 
tells of the location of the exhibit and indicates an expecta-
tion of "visitors." 
32 41 
tional intent set forth in Schneider v. State, supra. And we 
do not feel justified in impugning plaintiff's motive to sus-
tain legislation with such evils inherent in it. Compare 
Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, 310 U. S. at page 97. 
To avoid misunderstanding, perhaps we should say that, 
while absolute prohibition of commercial handbills seems to 
us of doubtful validity, yet we need decide no more here 
than that at least it cannot extend to a combined protest and 
advertisement not shown to be a mere subterfuge. And 
without attempting to suggest the form which regulation 
might take, though Schneider v. State, supra, appears to 
point the way, we think it proper to say that even an abso-
lute prohibition against casting matter into the streets is 
seemingly valid (cf. City of Philadelphia v. Brabendel', 201 
Pa. 574,51 A. 374, 58 L. R. A. 220 j Buxbom v. City of River-
side, D. C. S. D. Cal., 29 F. Supp. 3), and that regulation or 
licensing of solicitation for business enterprises to prevent 
imposition upon 01' inconvenience of the public is likewise 
sustainable under the cited precedents. 
Affirmed. 
Frank, Circuit Judge, dissents with opinion. 
FRANK, C. J., dissenting: 
To my mind, the majority opinion has reached the wrong 
conclusion primarily because it erroneously deals with this 
case as if it involved the attempted distribution of a single 
handbill of non~commercial or "free speech" character, 
which contains some related and incidental commercial or 
business advertising. On that fallacious assumption of fact, 
[fol. 44) the majority holds that the City ordinance, here be-
fore us, is unconstitutional in so far as it prohibits the dis-
tribution on City streets of such a non-commercial handbill. 
The opinion also expresses a doubt as to its constitutionality 
even as to wholly commercial or business advertising cir-
culars, but does not rest the decision on that ground. I shall 
late~ discuss that doubt; but first I shall try to show the 
error of the majority's factual premise, since, if that fails, 
the principal ground of its decision vanishes: 
Chrestensen had two separate and totally distinct dis-
putes with City officials, the one having to do with the loca-
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tion of his submarine, and the other with the distribution 
of his handbills: (a) The first dispute arose when he asked 
permission to do his business that of publicly showing his 
submarine for profit at a city-owned dock. When this re-
quest was refused by the Dock Commissioner, Chrestensen 
became indignant, [This indignation soon became, as we 
shall see, the subject of one of his handbills.] He was, how-
ever, able to arrange to display the submarine at a state-
owned dOelL (b) The second dist~nct dispute arose when 
he asked the police for permission to distribute on the City 
streets a handbill, Exhibit 1, which Chrestensen and the 
majority opinion concede to have been a frankly commercial 
handbill 'soliciting visitors to see his submarine on a paid 
admission basis. Because of the City ordinance here before 
us, the Police Commissioner, through his subordinates, 
denied this request. 
Then Ohrestensen prepared two handbills which are the 
subject of this litigation. They are not related, but he 
caused the two to be printed on the front and back, respec-
tively, of a single sheet of paper, Exhibit A: 
(a) On the face of this sheet, is printed a revised edition 
of Exhibit 1, his earlier commercial handbill; this revised 
handbill is described in the stipulation of facts (executed 
[fo1. 45] on Chrestensen's behalf and on the basis of which 
this case is being' decided) as consisting of "commercial 
and advertising matter informing the public of the location 
of" the submarine "and soliciting their patronage". It 
contains no expression of opinion on any subject, no protest 
against official action or against interference with Chres-
tensen's business. 
(b) On the reverse side of the same paper, Exhibit A, is 
printed another handbill. It does not, in any way, refer to 
the dispute with the police about the distribution of hand-
bills, but consists of a protest against the refusal to let 
Chr'estensen display his submarine at the City's dock. 
There was thus no inherent relation between the handbill 
printed on the face and this protest printed on the back of 
Exhibit A. The latter was, without question, an expression 
of opinion, the distribution of which, on the City streets, 
could not constitutionally be prevented. This no one denies: 
The City ordinance excepts such a handbill from its pro-
hibition, and the police expressly told Chrestensen that he 
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could separately distribute this "free speech" handbill, 
without police restraint, if only it was separated from the 
other handbill. 
There was reason why he could not do so i he elected, 
instead, to have both handbills printed on one piece of 
paper. The two circulars are not Siamese twim;. A$ they 
are unrelated in subject matter, they could easily have been 
divided without injury to either. N otbing in the majority 
opinion even intimates the contrary, even sugge~h~ that 
there is anything but a printer's or naper connection be-
tween the two. 
Since this purely paper tie is solely the result of the arbi-
trary choice of their common author, Chrestensen, he bas 
no standing to assert that we must consider that what the 
printer has joined no man can put asunder, that we mUHt, 
artificially, regard the two handbills as inseparable wben 
[fo1. 46] we are asked to exercise the delicate judicial power 
of nullifying legislation. It is as if the suit related to·a 
handbill advertising an automobile for sale which alHo in-
cluded an attack on Nazism or a protest against the tax 011 
cigarettes. Consequently, if we proceed on the principal 
assllIllption of the majority opinion, i. e., that the ordinance 
is invalid in so far as it prevents the distribution of any-
thing other than an outright and unmixed commercial hand-
bill, we should completely ignore the separable and inde-
pendent "free speech" circular on the back of Exhibit ~1, 
and consider the case pl'ecisely as if Chrestensen had been 
denied permission to distribute merely a handbill contain-
ing nothing except what is printed on the face of that paper. 
Thus considered, the issue narrows to this: Is that separable 
handbill, on the face of Exhibit A, wholly commercia11 
That it is wholly commercial is, to my mind, manifest: 
At the outset, it is essential to note that Chrestem~en \; pur-
pose or motive in proposing to distribute his odp;inal hand-
bill, Exhibit 1 which he withdrew and for which he I:\ub-
stituted the matter on the face of Exhibit .A .. is admitted 
to have been frankly and completely commercial. There i~ 
a presumption that, at least for a short interval, a man 'H 
purpose or motive continues the same. And so atl to Chres-
tensen.1 That in the distinct and separable "free speech" 
-,," , 
1 "Motive is a persuasive interpreter" even of Hequiv-
o(»"f conduct' '. Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Ry. Clerks, 281 
U 'So 548, 559. 
• 
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handbill, printed on the reverse' of Exhibit A,. Chrestensen 
had a quite different motive or purpose, surely does not 
overcome that presumption. 
And there is no other evidence to overcome it. Contrari-
wise, the record reenforces the presumption. Here we must 
turn to the stipulation of facts on which, as the majority 
opinion points out, the District Court exclusively relied 
when entering its final decree. There was no trial at which 
the testimony of witnesses was heard. We must assume, 
[fol. 47] therefore, that, if there had been such a trial, the 
City would have offered testimony conclusively proving"-
and that the trial court on that basis would have found-
the following facts set forth explicitly in that stipulation 
of facts: 
"5. Defendant, or his agents, by threatening to enforce 
the health regulation against plaintiff, has restrained plain-
tiff from distributing in the streets and other public places 
of the City of New York, copies of a certain handbill >I« * * 
a copy of which is attached to the Bill of Complaint and 
marked 'Plaintiff's Exhibit A' * * * 
"6. Handbill A bears on the face thereof oommeroial or 
business advertising matter informing the public of the 
location of plaintiff's exhibit and solioiting their patronage. 
"7. The reverse side of handbill A oontains, not com-
, 
mercia~ or business advertising matter, but rather a publio 
protest against the conduct of the New York City Depart-
ment of Docks in denying plaintiff wharfage facilities at 
piers owned by New York Oity and situated at the Battery. 
"S. Plaintiff had earlier, on or about June 29, 1940, pre-
pared a handbill, hereinafter called handbill No.1, a C0PY 
of which is attached hereto and marked 'Defendant's Ex-
hibit l' and by this reference made a part hereof. 
"The defendant, or his agents, informed the plaintiff that 
the distribution of handbill No.1 would be a violation of 
the park and health regulations but that plaintiff could dis-
tribute handbills which contained only information Ol' a 
public protest. 
, 'Plaintiff thereupon revised handbill No. 1 by removing 
from the face of it certain advertising matter and by print-
ing on the reverse side of the handbill a public protest, 
which revised handbill is handbill A. 
, 
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[fol.48] "Qn being shown a printer's proof of handbill A, 
defenda;nt, or his agents, advised plaintiff' that the P1'otCSt 
matter on the reverse side thereof C02tld be distributed with-
O~bt police restraint, if separated fro'tJt the co'rMne1'cial ad-
vertising matter remaining 011- the faoe thereof. 
"Plaintiff caused handbill A to be printed with the Raid 
protest matter appearing on the reverse side thereof, and 
has not attempted to dist1"ibute said protest matter (lis-
associated front said comme1"cial advertising mattet"" De-
fendant, or his agents, l'estrained the plaintiff from di~­
tributing handbill A, as descl'ibed in paragraphs 5 and 9 
hereof, and plaintiff thereupon brought this action. 
"9. Defendant by threatening to enforce the park regula-
tion against plaintiff has'· restrained plaintiff from display-
ing 'sandwichman' placards and from distributing copies 
of handbill .A. upon streets and sidewalks adjacent and eOll-
tiguous to the central area of Battery Park, but within the 
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Parks and possibly 
'within the borders of the various tracts of land dedicated 
for park purposes in the Battery Park area. 
"10. The restrai11,ts described in paragraphs ;) and 9 
-hereof have resulted, and their continuance 'Will 1'rs'ult, in 
a dimi'l1/lbtio'}~ of the number of pef'son.s payi1b(J fees for a(l-
mission, to plaintiff's submarine. The net p1'ofits which 
plaintiff would realize in the absence of said restraints 
exoeed the sum of three thousand dollars ($3,000)." 2 
Those stipUlated and uncontroverted facts taking the 
place, I repeat, of inferences which we must assume would 
irresistibly have been drawn from evidence which the City 
presumably would have offered in" the absence of a stipula-
tion leave no room for doubt, in my mind, that Exhibit A 
[fol. 49J 'consists (1) of a purely commercial ha:ndbill set 
forth in its face and (2) a separable free-speech handbill 
on the back. 3 
2 Italics are added. 
3 The District Judge, indeed, reached that conclusion as 
to Exhibit A in its entirety, in his opinion (rendered when 
he entered his preliminary injunction) in which he said, 
"The ordinance is clearly discriminatory against the busi-
ness~:7while affording"protection to p~l'sons distributing 
non- mmercial handbills ., .. .." 34 Fed. Supp. 596, 600. 
• 
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If Chre:stensen had taken the witness stand and testified, 
without equivocation, that his intention with respect to mat-
ter on the face of the paper was wholly commercial as' con-
trasted with his intention as to the matter on the reverse 
side, which was non-commercial, we would stultify ourselves 
if we disregarded such evidence. I can perceive no differ-
ence between such testimony and the statement in the stipu-
lation of facts, executed on Chrestensen's behalf, that Ex-
hibit A bears on its face" commercial or business advertis-
ing matter' " while, on the other hand, "the reverse side 
'" * oX- contains, not commercial or business advertising 
matter, but rather a public protest * * *" Why should 
we disregard Chrestensen's own interpretation of his two 
distinct purposes 1 
Moreover, in ascertaining his purpose, we may take judi-
cial notice of the motives which commonly operate upon 
human conduct; it has been said that human nature con-
stitutes part of the evidence in every case; and that judges 
are supposed to be acquainted with the ordinary sentiments 
of the people among whom they live.4 "We take judicial 
cognizance of all matters of general knowledge", said the 
Supreme Court.5 And if a court may judicially notice that 
many men postpone being shaved until Sunday,6 of the char-
acteristics of the game of ping pong,7 and of horse races,s of 
[fo1. 50] how shoe-shining parlors are run,9 of the reliance 
of waiters on tips from patrons,lO of the end of the yachting 
season,l1 of the kicking propensities of mules,12 we should 
not confess that we are so cloistered that we do not know 
423 C. J. 149, notes 9, 10, 11 . 
5 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 421. 
6 State v. Petit, 74 Minn. 376, 77 N. W. 225 aff'd. 177 U. S. 
164. 
7 U. S. v. Strauss, 136 F. 185. 
8 Weber v. Ohicago, 50 IlL A. 110, aff'd. 148 IU. 313, 36 
N. E. 70. 
9 Barlin v. Knox Oounty, 136 Tenn. 238, 188 S. W. 795. 
10 Sloat v. Rochester Taxicab Co., 163 N. Y. S. 904, aff'd. 
221 N. Y. 491, 116 N. E. 1076. 
11 The Conquerer, 166 U. S. 110. 
12 Consolidation Coal Co. v. Pratt, 169 Ky. 464, 18~ S. W. . 
369. 
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that the dominant purpose of most men, 'UJhe1~ engaged in 
b1('siness, is to seek customers and make profits. There is no 
cynicism in that observation: While the average American 
is by no means an economic man, yet his economic strivings, 
at those moments when he is functioning as a business man, 
are entirely legitimate; and it would be unwise for judges 
to be so naive as to ignore them. According-Iy, Chrestensen 
being a business man, we are more than justified in conclud-
ing that, as his sale purpose in connection with his original 
handbill was unquestionably commercial, his purpose in 
trying to distribute the handbill found on the face of Ex-
hibit A was the same. We know that his business is that 
of showing his submarine for profit; we know that, if mem-
bers of the public appeared, in response to the irlYitation in 
that handbill, they would be charged admissiOl1 i we lOlo,,, 
that that is why Chrestensen wanted them to appear i we 
know that he does not display his submarine for educational 
or propaganda purposes. Why, then, should we refuse to 
recogl1ize that the handbill in question was commercial' 
To be sure, there have been cases, cited in the majority 
opinion, 13 where one handbill contains two purposes which 
so inextricably penetrate one another so as to make fission 
impossible or impracticable; in that event, if the dominant 
purpose is non-commercial, the ordinance, in order to pre-
serve ~ts constitutionality, would be so interpreted as not 
[fol. 51] to bring the handbill within its scope.14 But that 
is not this case, for there is no evidence here of mixed mo-
tives aa to the handbill on the face of Exhibit A.lo There 
is, therefore, no reason for our discussing problems not now 
before us relating to mixed purpose handbills i the Supreme 
Court, since the beginnings of our government, has wisely 
" , , , 
13 People v. Young, 308 147; People v. Taylor, 85 Pac. 
(2d) 978. 
14 See People v. Loring and Green, unreported, but noted 
in 1 Int'!. Juridical Ass'n. Bull. No. 12, p. 2, where the ordi-
nance was held inapplicable to a leaflet announcing a meet-
ing and specifying the price of admission. 
15 The other "free speech" handbill, on the reverse side 
of the paper, does advise the public to visit the submarine. 
It might be argued that this showed a partial commercial 
purpose. But the city conceded that that separable hand-
bill was freely distributable, if separated. 
• 
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refused to cross imaginary bridges.16 We should not be 
disturbed because, in the future, cases may arise where 
there will be some difficulty in ascertaining the primary pur-
pose in distributing a handbill, and, because, when such 
cases arise, the courts may not be able to stop at locating' 
merely the north and south poles of the subject matter, but 
may be required to do a more precise job of legal map-mak-
ing and to fix a definite equatorial line. Where to draw such 
lines "is the question in pretty much everything worth ar-
guing in the law", Mr. Justice Holmes often notedP As he 
said, some forty years ago,18 "In our approach towards ex-
actness we constantly tend to work out definite lines or 
equators to mark distinctions which we first notice as a dif-
ference of poles. It is evident in the beglnning that there 
[fo1. 52] must be differences in the legal position of infants 
and adults. In the end we establish twenty-one as the divid-
ing point. There is a difference manifest at the outset be-
tween night and day. The statutes of Massachusetts fix the 
dividing points at one hour after sunset and one hour be-
fore sunrise, ascertained according to mean time. When he 
has discovered that a difference is a difference of degree, 
that distinguished extremes have between them a penumbra 
in which one gradually shades into the other, a tyro thinks 
to puzzle you by asking where you are going to draw the 
line, and an advocate of more experience will show the arbi-
• 
16 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346; Cf. Alabama 
Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464, Concurring opinion in 
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 460. 
17 Irwin v. Gavitt, 268 U. S. 161, 168; cf. Superior Oil Co. 
v. Mississippi, 280 U. S. 390; Empire Trust Co. v. Cahan, 
274 U. S. 473, 478; Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 631-
632; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 241; Louisville 
Gas .& Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 41; Quaker 
City Cab Co. v' Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 403; Nash v . 
United States, 229 U. S. 373, 376; Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 
U. S. 625, 630, 631. See Oardozo, The Nature of the J udi-
cial Process (1921) 46; The Paradoxes of Legal Science 
(1928) 62. 
18 Law in Science Science in Law, Collected Legal Pa-
pers (1920) 210, 232-233 (reprinted from 12 Harv. L. Rev. 
[1899] 443); Cf. Holmes, The Oommon Law (1881) 127, 
110, 68 . 
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trariness of the line proposed by putting cases very near 
to it on one side or the other. But the theory of the law is 
that such lines exist, because the theory of the law as to any 
possible conduct is that it is either lawful or unlawful. As 
that difference has no gradation about it, when applied to 
shades of conduct that are very neal' each other, it has an 
arbitrary look. We like to disguise the arbitrariness, w'e 
like to save ourselves the trouble of nice and doubtful dis-
criminations". Nevertheless, on occasions, the courts must 
and do take that trouble. They have done so recently, with 
great frequency, in the field of taxation. Cf. Harrison 
v. Schaffner, U. S. (1941). 
Difficulties, far greater than those here confronting us, 
involved in ascertaining a dominant intent, purpose or 
motive, or in disentangling mixed intentions, purposes or 
motives, have not heretofore deterred the courts from doing 
so; they have not found it impossible to answer such ques-
tions as that which perplexes my colleagues, i. e., "How 
much is 'primarily' 1"; they have not failed to make wba t 
the majority somewhat invidiously calls "refined distinc-
tions". Thus, to cite but one example, although a statute 
is itself constitutional, its enforcement will be enjoined 
where a court, on the basis of elaborate evidenee extrjnsic 
[fol. 53] to the statute, finds operative in its actual admin-
istration a discriminatory purpose or motive of an uncou-
stitutional kind.10 In such cases, the purpose or motive is 
not, as the majority opinion suggests, determined by any 
subtle or occult" subjective" test. 
And especially in the instant case there need be no ju-
dicial anguish in drawing a line, and no occasion for psy-
chological probings of Chrestensen's mental interior in 
order to ascertain what he was after, when endeavoring' to 
distribute the matter on the face of Exhibit A: His original 
purpose, the contents of his stipulation of facts, his com-
plaint that the enforcement of the City's ordinance dimin-
ished the number of persons paying fees for admission 
10 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 373, 374; Cumber-
land Coal Co. v. Board of Revision, 284 U. S. 23, 28; Norris 
v. A.labama, 294 U. S. 587. For other illustrations. cf. 
Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 
(1894), Collected Legal Papers (1920) 117; Paul, Selected 
Studies in Taxation, Second Series (1938) 255 ff. 
, 
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so as to cause him a loss of profits in excess of $3,000,2° 
are ample objective indicia of a commercial purpose with 
reference to the separable handbill printed on the front of 
Exhibit A. A shrinking from the use of such evidence is 
of a piece with the hostility to the employment of so-called 
"circumstantial evidence" which our court recently con-
demned in F. W. Woolworth v. N. L. R. B., Fed. (2d) -
(C. C. A. 1941) ; we there said that "courts, * ~ * in 
a multitude of cases, must rely upon such evidence i. e., 
inferences from testimony as to attitudes, acts and deeds; 
where such matters as purpose, plan, designs, motives, 
intent, or similar matters, are involved, the use of such 
inferences is often indispensable. Persons engaged in un-
lawful conduct seldom write letters or make public pro-
[fo1. 54] nouncements explicitly stating' their attitudes or 
objectives; the evidence does not come in packages labelled 
'Use me', like the cake, bearing the words 'Eat me', which 
Alice found helpful in Wonderland". 
Suppose that a department store, whose owners were rec-
ognized as not being in business for their health, were to 
attempt to distribute, on the streets, a handbill saying 
nothing but. this: "We have on display at our store many 
copies of beautiful early American furniture". If the 
store owners sought an injunction to restrain the city from 
preventing the distribution on the streets of such an ad-
vertisement, a court surely would not grant the injunction 
because the handbill itself contained nothing which dis-
closed a commercial intention. It would not say that, as 
the advertisement was silent as to sales, it must be assumed 
that there was little or no profit motive behind it, but merely 
a desire to educate. The judicial vision is not so feeble 
that it cannot look beyond the contents of such a paper. 
And yet that is the attitude of the majority in Chrestensen's 
case. 
20 Even if it were true that federal jurisdictioRrequired 
such an allegation, that would not serve to diminish the sig-
nificance of that complaint as to loss of profits. For the 
Constitutional objection could as well have been raised in 
the state court. Moreover, it is highly doubtful whether 
such an allegation was necessary in this case to ensure 
federal jurisdiction. See Hague v. C. 1. 0., 307 U. S. 496, 
508. 
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It is a strange and novel doctrine that his intention must 
be discovered without any reference to data not found in 
the document itself, that even his own explicit statement 
of his intention, contained in the stipulation, cannot be 
looked at. Except where the parole evidence rule of the 
Statute of Frauds is applicable, judges have not heretofore 
disclosed such timidity, have not denied themselveH the mole 
of those usual objective means of ascertaining intention 
which are open to ordinary men. 
The majority opinion, however, suggests tha t if the (',ourLS 
were to sanction the use of such evidence extrinsic to the 
document, the result would be that the City's police officers 
would become the "arbiters" of the citizen's intention, with 
a consequent arbitrary power, not reviewable by the court.'4, 
to interfere with the distribution of free speech handbills. 
Of course, that cannot be true. Whatever may be the 11l!.:'U11S 
[fol. 55] employed by city officials to determine whether a 
handbill is commercial, the courts are open to the citizen 
who believes that the City's official's decision is incorrect. 
I cannot, however, believe it necessary or propel' for the 
courts to attempt to prevent any possible abuRe of official 
power by holding that legislation is unconstitutional which 
confers upon officials the legitimate exercise of Ruch power. 
Nothing in the Constitution justifies such conduct by the 
judiciary; a constitution which gave judges that kind of 
authority, and which they exercised, would caUHe that 
paralysis of government and that condition of nnarc.hy, 
leading ultjmately to despotism, which our Constitution, so 
The Federalist tells us, was designed to preyent. 21 
2. The majority, in its opinion, however, strongly inti-
mates that if it had concluded that this case related solely 
• 
to a wholly commercial circular, it would nevel'thelesH hav(' 
held the ordinance unconstitutional. In other words, the 
majority finds it difficult to see why (a) if, as is without 
doubt true, a business man may not constitutionally be 
prevented from cireularizing', in public places, a proteRt 
against official action affecting his business, he mm;t not 
also (b) be similarly protected in distributing business cir-
culars wholly designed to procure public patronagll for 
profit. Both, the majority sug'gests, are protected by the 
, , . , 
21 Cf. The Federalist (Earle's edition, 1937) No. 70 (p. 
454); cf. No. 68 (p. 444) and No. 51 (p. 337). 
-
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constitutional principle of free speech which paralyzes or 
numbs the City's so-called "police power". I cannot agree. 
Constitutional, like other legal principles, do not dwell 
a la Robinson Crusoe, or in an anarchic state of nature 
where there is a war of all ag'ainst all; they must learn to 
live with one another, sociably, in a sort of democracy of 
ideas in which none is dictator. Thus, for example, due 
process, although it must yield somewhat when it ·encoun-
[fo1. 56] tel's the war power, or the power to exclude aliens, 
or the bankruptcy power, is still not impotent.22 
There need, therefore, be no ruthless dogma fight to a 
finish between the city's so-called "police power" (exercis-
able for the group welfare) and the constitutional right of 
the individual to free speech and free expression of ideas. 
It has been recognized, since at least the time of Aristotle, 
that it is dangerous to give anyone principle its head, to 
regard it as an absolute, to let it work its way out, uncurbed, 
to its extreme logical limit.23 We must, rather, regard 
principles as each expressing a general tendency to be 
reconciled with other such, principles. "To bring about re-
conciliations" of legal principles is "the great role of 
jurists"; their task, in the face of contradictory principles, 
is that of" cutting out a little here and a little there * * 'r 
As Montesquieu observed, 'despots alone try to govern 
everything with a general scheme and a rigid will' 'iI- * * 
The contradictory elements frequently found in problems 
*' * * throw us into a regime of concession or com-
promise * * * Thus we reach that middle ground which 
is all that we can hope for in this world".24 
22 See Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 589, 
note 19. 
23 Hudson Water 00. v. McCarter, 209U. S. 349, 355. 
24 Demogue, Analysis of Fundamental Nations (Modern 
French Legal Philosophy, in the Modern Legal Philosophy 
Series, 1921) 570, 413, 394. 
"All ideas of truth are false, that is, contradictory and 
irrational, if one attaches to them an exclusive and abso-
lute meaning; they are all verities, that is susceptible of 
realization and utility, if they are viewed in relation to 
others, or in evolution". Proudhon, PhilosQphie Du 
Progres (1868) 22, quoted by Borchard, Governmental Re-
sponsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L. J. (1927) 1039, 1041, note 2. 
C" 
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Nor should that distress us. For compromise is the very 
" 
essence of living. Wailing is a compromise between falling 
down and standing' up j sleep is a compromise between full 
vitality and death. All compromises are not evil 01' foolish. 
There is an obvious distinction between intelligent, courage-
[fo1. 57] ous compromjse or adjustment and cowardly 
appeasement. Our Oonstitution, as every school boy knows, 
is a set of compromises. Government in a democracy i:-; con-
stantly engaged in a series of experiments in achieving com-
promises; 25 its aim is, 01' should be, almost always to find a 
middle ground; if such a government tends, in some re-
spects, to be less flexible in war-time, that, too, is but a 
temporary compromise with the basic tenets of a democracy 
in order to preserve them.26 
Loa ,",,' ,'". • 
25 Cf. Mr. Justice Douglas, Democracy and Finance (1940) 
240 ff. 260 ff. 
In Chappell v. Ellis, 123 N. C. 259, 31 S. E. 709 (1898) the 
court said that "we feel compelled to carry out a principle 
only to its necessary and logical results, and not to ib; fur-
thest theoretical limit, in disregard of other essential 
principles. The one universal law of nature is that all action, 
animate as well as inanimate, is the result of conflicting 
forces. The orbit of the earth depends upon the exquisite 
adjustment of two conflicting forces, the centripetal power 
of attraction, and the centrifugal force of momentum. The 
preponderance of either would lead to inevitable destruc-
tion. The trajectory of every shot is governed by three op-
posing forces, momentum, friction, and gravitation j for 
speed with which it leaves the gun, the resistance of the at-
mosphere, and the attraction of the earth. It is HO with 
human action. Government itself is recognized as spring-
ing from the love of personal liberty, on the one hand, and 
the desire for personal protection, on the other. It is said 
that their just equilibrinm produces a government of liberty 
without license, and of law without tyranny, but that its dis-
turbance would lead to anarchy or to despotism. We do not 
feel at liberty to adopt anyone prineiple as the sole guide of 
our decisions, and to carry it out to extreme and dangerous 
limits, regardless of other great principles of justice and 
of law, so firmly established by reason and precedent." 
26 Article 1, section 9 of the Constitution expressly pro-
vides that the privilege of habeas corpus may be suspended 
""""'1""' LZ 42 , 
, 5 
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Absolutists Slleer at compromises; "they are the Gordian 
knot-cutters; they may undo the knot, but they ruin the 
rope"; life, they think, "can be folded neatly down the mid-
cUe, with all the good on one side, all the bad on the other, 
[fo1. 58] and everything is accounted for * * *" 27 As 
Morley said, "The disciples of the relative may afford to 
compromise. The disciples of the absolute, never,'.28 Even 
Hobbes, generally (although perhaps erroneously) regarded 
as an extreme absolutist, said that "in a way beset with 
those that contend, on one side for too great liberty, and on 
the other side, for too much Authority, 'tis hard to pass be-
tween the points of both unwounded * * * For as long 
as every man holdeth this Right of doing anything he liketh, 
so long are men in the condition of War." 29 
The right of free speech and free expression, because of 
our history, is one of our fundamental liberties, singularly 
well protected,so it, therefore, comes as near to creating an 
absolute principle as any fostered by our Constitution.S! 
And, particularly today, freedom of expression is a value 
which Americans should dearly cherish. For it is our chal-
•• , = • • 
_ ... _._ ... _"b .. ___ ...... _'EO ,,," _a.a_ .a.a ___ _ 
when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may 
require it; and see Amendment 5 as to presentment or in-
dictment of a grand jury. Cf. Mr. Justice Reed's sugges-
tion, in Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Co., 312 U. S. 281., 
320; "Free speech may be absolutely prohibited only under 
the most pressing national emergencies. These emergencies 
must be of the kind that justify the suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus or the suppression of the right of'trial by 
jury". 
27 Hayakawa, Language in Action (1941) 133,126. 
28 Oompromise, 44. 
29 Leviathan (1651), dedicatory letter and p. 65. 
30 Schneider v. State., 308 U. S. 147, 161. 
310hief Justice Stone suggests that the usual presump-
tion of constitutionality is restricted in scope when legisla~ 
tion appears on its face to offend the specific provisions in 
the first ten amendments' 'which are deemed equally specific 
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth". U. S. v. 
Oarolene Products Co., .304 U. S. 144, 152 n. Of. Hamilton 
and Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court, 
50 Yale L. J.1319, 1352 ff. 
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lenge to dictatorship and its vaunted efficiency. Desirable 
social adjustments, as well as increased efficiency in indus-
try, derive from new ideas; and new ideas will be stifled, 
even in the minds of tp.eir originatorsr if not given expres-
sion; the uncommunicated thought is usually still-born. We 
may rejoice that there is embodied in our Constitution a be-
lief that (to quote our wise and eloquent Senior Circuit 
Judge) "where heterodoxy in what men prize most is a 
crime, fresh thinking about anything will disappear", a 
[fol. 59] "faith that our collective fate in the end depends 
upon the irrepressible fertility of the individual • • • , , 32 
But even the principle of free speech is not an absolute; 
it has its limitations.aa Thus one may commit a crime, or 
be guilty of an actionable wrong, if he wantonly shouts 
"fire" in a crowded theater; or utters certain kinds of un-
truths or, in some circumstances, even truths.M And, 
while the City's "police power" must give ground before 
the right of free speech, that power, although then 
chastened, is not utterly destroyed; the Supreme Court 
merely says that, in that event, the power must be used 
plmitively and after the fact by fining or jailing those who 
abuse the privilege and not preventively. Schneider v. 
State, 308 U. S. 147, 148. 
However, the historical events which yielded the constitu-
tional protection of free speech and free expression do not 
by any means compel or even suggest the conclusion that 
there is an equally important constitutional right to dis-
tribute commercial handbills for the purpose of profit-
making so imperative that the City's "police power" 
must similarly be reduced (from prevention to punishment 
after the fact) when pieces of paper, devised for business 
purposes, may litter its streets to the injury of public health 
or safety. Were the concept of free expression so extensive 
32 Learned Hand, Liberty, 4 Yale Alumni Magazine (1941) 
10, 12. 
3a Cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160; of. Gorin v. 
United States, 312 U. S. 19. 
84 American Bank & Trust Company v. Federal Bank, 256 
U. S. 350, 358; Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 Harv. 
L. Rev. (1894) 1, Collected Legal Papers (1920) 117. 
56 
in scope, the o'(1tdoor advertising and billboard cases 35 
would be inexplicable; surely the recent "free speech" de~ 
[fol. 60J cisions of the Supreme Court are not to be read as 
over-ruling those precedents. In Schneider v. People, 308 
U. S. 147 (1939), when upholding the right to distribute 
leafiets, as in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444,452 (1937), the 
Court was referring to "historic weapons in the defense of 
liberty" such as "the pamphlets of Thomas Paine". And 
the Oourt has recently described those cases, and Hague v. 
C. I. 0., 307 U. S. 396 (1939), as "concerned with restric-
tions cutting off appropriate means through which, in a free 
society, the processes of popular rule may effectively func-
tion"; Minersville District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 599, 
note 6 (1940).36 . 
Such men as Thomas Paine, John Milton and Thomas 
Jefferson were not fighting for the right to peddle com-
mercial advertising. That is not at all to decry the profit-
making zeal of the American business man. I, for one, 
would not refer, as the majority does, to a "commercial 
taint". For, as ours is a profit economy, no business man 
need apologize for seeking personal gain by all legitimate 
means. But the constitutional limitations on legislation 
affecting such pursuits are not as specific and exacting as 
those imposed on ,legislation interfering with free speech. 
To prevent the peddling of business handbills on the street 
still leaves the businessman at liberty to use other modes 
of advertising, as in newspapers, for instance.37 
I most heartily agree with the statements in the majority 
opinion that the right of free speech is no "more applicable 
to group protest for abstract religious or political principles 
than to individual protests for concrete business injuries" 
. ,.. 
35 Fifth Avenue Coach 00. v. New York City, 221 U. S. 467 
(1911); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U. S. 105 (1932). See 
also Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 236 U. S. 
230, 243-244 (1915); Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 
U. S. 288, 313-316 (1912) ; cf. Stromberg v. California, 283 
U. S. 359, 369 (1931) with Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34 
(1907). 
36 Italics in the quotation are added. 
31 A discrimination which favors newspaper advertising 
is not unconstitutional. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U. S. 
105 (1932). 
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and that "the expression in public places by handbill or 
circular" cannot be "forbidden to the businessman who 
would make a protest against official mistreatment of bbn-
self in his business affairs". But it is one thing thus to say 
[fol. 61] that a protest by a businessman against mistreat-
ment of himself in business affairs must be regarded as COll-
stitutionally protected free speech and quite another to say 
the same of the businessman's circulars advertising for 
business. For the right of free speech guaranteed by the 
Constitution is the right to disseminate opinion; the pro-
tection accorded to tbis right, which renders invalid any 
effort to prohibit the distribution of free speech documel1ts, 
should not be extended to commercial advertisements simply 
because the word "speechD, taken alone, includes both social 
and business discourse.s8 
I can find neither reason nor authority for such an exten-
sion. So to amplify the constitutional guaranty would be 
to "thingify" the words "free speech D and "free expres-
sion", and to become forgetful of the vital ideas "the de-
fense of liberty" and the functioning of "the processes of 
popular rule" for which they stand.30 The danger of 
converting words into thought-paralyzing entities is illus-
trated by the judicial history of the phrase' 'liberty of con-
tract". Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905) 
with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 391-
394 (1937).40 The Supreme Court recently reminded us 
that such "tags are not instruments of adjudication but 
statements of result in applying the constitutional test 
* * .. Ambiguous intimations of g-eneral phrases in opin-
ions torn from the significance of concrete circumstances 
"" 'II ., do not alter the limited nature of the function" 
of the courts ., Ii< • "We must be on our guard against 
imprisoning" the powers of the states and their subdivi-
[fol. 62] sions "within formulas that are not compelled by 
the Oonstitution but merely represent judicial generaliza-
. , 
38 One is reminded of the librarian who, in his catalogue, 
put' 'Mill on Liberty" and followed this notation by "Ditto 
on the Floss". 
39 Holmes, Law in Science· .science in Law, Collected 
Legal Papers, supra, 238, 230-232. 
(0 See discussion of those cases in Hume v. J\{oore-~{c-
Cormack Lines, Inc., I Fed. (2d) (0. C. A. 2, 1941). 
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tions exceeding the concrete circumstances wIDch they pro-
fess to summarize". Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney, 311 U. S. 
435, 444-445. Particularly when we are asked to exercise 
the high judicial prerogative of holding legislation uncon-
stitutional, we should resist the seductive power of words, 
of which Ingraham has given the classic illustration: "We 
do no~ often", he writes,41 "have occasion to speak, as an 
indivisible whole, of the group of phenomena involved in 
or connected with the transit of a Negro over a rail fence 
with a watermelon under his arm when the moon is just 
passing under a cloud. But if this collocation of phenomena 
were of frequent occurrence, and if we did have occasion 
to speak of it often, and if its happening were likely to 
affect the money market, we should have some name such 
as 'Wousin' to denote it by. People would in time be dis-
puting whether the existence of a vVousin involved neces-
sarily a rail fence, an~ whether the term could be applied 
when a white man is similarly related to a stone wall". The 
principle of free speech should not be demeaned by turning 
it into a W ousin. 
It may be that the majority was affected by an argument, 
advanced by Chrestensen, that, because the ordinance per-
mits the free circularization of non-commercial handbills, 
which have no less a capacity to litter the streets, it is in 
violation of the "equal protection" clause of the Constitu-
tion. But that clause does not prohibit a reasonable classi-
fication; and it is well established that, if there is a rational 
basis for a classification, the legislature may select for cor-
rection a particular one out of several similar evils. Sproles 
v. Binford, 286 U. S. 374, 396. Apart from that, here the 
classification is one established by the Constitution itself. 
Once it is admitted that non-commercial handbills are, con-
[fo1. 63] stitutionally outside the scope of the so-called 
police power, it follows that legislation which operates only 
on that part of the field which is left, i. e., commercial hand-
bills, is employing the very classification imposed by the 
Constitution itself. Accordingly, in Packer Corporation v. 
Utah, 285 U. S. 105, the Supreme Court upheld a statute 
prohibiting billboard advertising of tobacco, rejecting the 
contention that it was' unreasonable to discriminate in favor 
of newspaper advertising, which was protected because 
41 Swain School Lectures 121, quoted in Ogden and Rich-
ards, The Meaning of Meaning (2d ed.) 416. 
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newspapers circulate in interstate commerce. The Court 
said: "The classification alleged to be arbitrary was made 
in order to comply with the requirement of the Federal COll-
stitution as interpreted and applied by the highest court of 
the State. Action by a .state taken to observe one prohibi-
tion of the Constitution does not entail the violation of 
another [citing cases]". Cf. also J. E. Raley & Brothers v. 
Richardson, 264 U. S. 157, 160. 
There remains a contention advanced by appellee against 
the ordinance which the majority opinion does not consider, 
but which, because I regard the ordinance valid, I must dis-
cuss: The ordinance expressly prohibits only commercial 
advertising and does not mention a dual purpose document 
of the kind before us. Aside from the fact that, in applying 
the statute as it did, the City was engaged in a propel' ad-
ministrative fuuction, I would not interpret the statute to 
permit the distribution of such an artificial hybrid as this, 
since that would, by pointing the way to easy evasion, 
utterly destroy the efficacy of the prohibition. The ordi-
nance, as originally enacted, did not expressly exempt com-
mercial handbills, but such an exemption was read into it 
in 1921 by People v. Johnson, 117 Misc. 133, to avoid a con-
flict with the New York Constitution. This judicial con-
struction, of course, carved out of the statute's realm only 
handbills which were constitutionally protected. In 1938, 
an express exemption of non-commercial advertising was 
[fo1. 64] added, presumably in response to Lovell v. Griffin, 
303 U. S. 444, which held that a blanket ordinance was 
"invalid on its face":t2 The legislative intention was 
patently merely to exclude such a control of handbills as 
would render the ordinance invalid under the Federal con-
stitution. Clearly what was meant was that only handbills 
not constitutionally subject to such regulation were not to 
be included. Any handbill primarily commercial was to be 
covered; and certainly a separable commercial handbill 
was so included. That the courts should regard the obvious 
legislative intention, and not thwart it by narrow construc-
tion, has been vigorously stated in recent decisions. See 
United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U. S. 
534, 543; Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 489; 
• 
42 It is, of course, immaterial that the amendment, be-
cause of the established judicial construction of the statute, 
may have been adopted out of an excess of caution. 
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United States v. Dickerson, 310 U. S. 554, 562. Mr. Justice 
Holmes, on Circuit, in Johnson v. United States, 163 Fed. 
3'0, 32 (C. C. A. 1, 1908),48 said that "it is not an adequate 
discharge of duty for the courts to say: 'We see what you 
are driving at, but you have not said it ;; if; *'." 
I conclude, therefore, that Chrestensen's paper includes 
a separate outright commercial handbill; that that separate 
handbill is within the prohibition of the ordinance; and that 
the constitutional guaranty or free speech does not render 
unconstitutional the prohibition of the distribution on the 
Oity's streets of such a purely commercial advertisement 
merely because it is deliberately coupled with a totally dis-
tinct and easily separable exercise of the privilege of free 
speech. 
[fo1. 65] UWITED STATES OIRCUIT OOURT OF ApPEALS, SECOND 
OIROUIT 
• 
At a Stated Term of the United States Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in and for the Second Circuit, held at the United 
States Courthouse in the Oity of New York, on the 19th 
day or August one thousand nine hundred and forty-one. 
Present: Hon. Thomas W. Swan, Hon. Oharles E. Clark, 
Hon. Jerome N. Frank, Circuit Judges. 
F. J. CHRESTENSEN, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
LEWIS J. VALENTINE, Individually and as Police Commis-
sioner of New York Oity, Defendant-Appellant 
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the 
Southern District of New York 
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record 
from the District Oourt of the United States for the South-
ern District of New York, and was argued by counsel. 
On Oonsideration Whereof, it is now hereby ordered, ad-
judged, and decreed that the decree of said District Court 
be and it hereby is affirmed with costs. . 
43 Cited and quoted with approval in Keifer & K;eifer v. 
R. F. 0.,306 U. S. 381, 391, note 4 (1939). 
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It is further ordered that a Mandate issue to the said 
District Court in accordance with this decree. 
D. E. Roberts, Clerk. 
[fol. 66] [Endorsed:] United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, Second Circuit. F. J. Chrestensen v. Lewis J. Val-
entine, individually and as Police Commissioner of New 
York City. Order for Mandate. United States Circuit 
Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Filed Aug. 19, 1941. 
D. E. Roberts, Clerk. 
[fol. 67] Clerk's Certificate to foregoing transeript omit-
ted in printing. 
(6902) 
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[fol. 68] SUPREME OOURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
ORDER ALLOWING CERTIORARI. Filed November 24, 1941 
The petition herein for a writ of certiorari to the United 
States Circuit Oourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit is 
granted. 
And it is further ordered that the duly certified copy of 
the transcript of the proceedings below which accompanied 
the petition shall be treated as though filed in response to 
such writ. 
.am" 
Endorsed on Cover: File No. 46,035, U. S. Oircuit Oourt 
of Appeals, Second Circuit. Term No. 707. Lewis J. Val-
entine, Individually and as Police Commissioner of the 
Oity of New York, Petitioner, vs. F. J. Chrestensen. Peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari and exhibit thereto. Filed 
October 21, 1941, Term No. 707 O. T.1941. 
(8151) 
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